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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 6/81)

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USSR REPORT
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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

BOOK DESCRIBES SOVIET VIEWS ON HELSINKI ACCORDS

Moscow KURSOM KHEL'SINKSKIKH DOGOVORENNOSTEY in Russian 1980 pp 1, 2, 3-6, 63-112, 217-219, 224

[Table of Contents, Introduction, the Chapter on "Military Detente: An Urgent Task of the Present Time" and the Conclusion from the book by S. Vladimirov and L. Teplov, edited by V. I. Stepakov]

[Excerpts] Title Page:

Title: KURSOM KHEL'SINKSKIKH DOGOVORENNOSTEY (On the Course of the Helsinki Accords)

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Brief Description:

The book discloses the specific content of the peace-loving initiatives which have been undertaken by the Soviet Union along with the other countries of the socialist commonwealth for implementing the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, it unmasks the activities of NATO and the military industrial complexes of the Western powers, primarily the United States, which are acting against the Helsinki Accords.

The book is designed for specialists in international affairs and readers who are interested in urgent problems of international life.

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[Introduction]

1 August 1980 marks the 5th anniversary of the signing in the Finnish capital of Helsinki of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The conference was called upon the initiative of the socialist countries. Signed by the leaders of 33 European states as well as by the United States and Canada, this document is of truly historical significance for the fates of the peoples of Europe and the entire world. In taking a long view of the Final Act, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, emphasized in his speech at the all-European conference: "The document being signed by us is a broad but clear platform for the actions of states on a unilateral, bilateral and multilateral basis for years and possibly decades to come."

It can be said that literally from the first day of signing the Final Act, the Soviet Union, together with the fraternal socialist nations, have fought steadily and consistently for the unswerving and strict fulfillment of all provisions of this document, without exception, fully and in all areas--political, economic and humanitarian. The USSR has fought to extend political detente and complement it with military detente. Precisely the policy of primarily the socialist countries can serve and actually does serve as a model of an honest, conscientious and creative approach to carrying out the Helsinki Accords.

In acting in accord with the letter and spirit of the Final Act, the countries of the socialist commonwealth in recent years have made a whole series of important constructive proposals aimed at implementing and developing the provisions contained in this document. At meetings of the Political Consultative Committee [PCC], at sessions of the Foreign Ministers Committee of the Warsaw Pact Organization and at other joint forums and meetings, the socialist countries by concrete deeds and initiatives convincingly affirmed and today affirm the significance which they give to the questions of strengthening European security and developing cooperation among states with different social systems in a spirit of the Final Act. This is understandable. For this is the fixed and principled policy of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries, the policy of the struggle for peace bequeathed by V. I. Lenin and reinforced in the decisions of the fraternal party congresses.

Detente in Europe is naturally a collective concern which requires the efforts of all the involved states. In recognizing that under present-day conditions, when weapons capable of destroying all living things on our world have been developed and stockpiled in enormous quantities and that there is no reasonable alternative to the policy of detente, the Western countries who showed a feeling of realism in

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the course of the European-wide conference, made a corresponding contribution to the common noble cause, having put their signatures to the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. All of this, of course, has helped to improve the political climate on the European continent and beyond it.

However, at the end of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's, the imperialist circles of the West, and primarily the United States, have intentionally followed a policy of exacerbating the situation in the world and undermining a lessening of international tension; they have begun intensive sniping at the Helsinki Accords.

What is the reason for such a change in Washington's policy? The main thing is that imperialism and the international reaction do not want to accept the steady change in the balance of forces in favor of socialism and peace or the further strengthening of the worldwide positions of the socialist commonwealth. Facts speak for themselves: the 50 million people of heroic Vietnam have victoriously established themselves as the reliable and strong outpost of socialism in Southeast Asia. The courageous peoples of Laos and Kampuchea have set out on the path of building the foundations of socialism.

The struggle of peoples for national and social liberation has grown wider and is continuing to develop. Liberation movements have been victorious in Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Zimbabwe and Guinea-Bissau. This has been a great blow against imperialism. A mass movement is growing in South Africa, the last bastion of colonialism and racism in the south of Africa. This is the objective course of history. "The more the opportunities of imperialism are reduced to rule over other nations and peoples," said L. I. Brezhnev on 22 February 1980 in the Kremlin, "the more rabidly its most aggressive and shortsighted representatives respond to this."²

The situation in the 1970's was very complex. It was characterized by a deepening of the general crisis of capitalism. Economic instability, financial disturbances, a steep inflationary spiral, the growth of unemployment, enormous military outlays and the energy crisis--all of this exacerbated the sociopolitical situation in the capitalist countries.

In this situation, in benefiting from events in Afghanistan, the ruling imperialist circles in the West, and primarily the American Administration, began an offensive against detente. "The present U.S. leadership," said L. I. Brezhnev, "is carrying out a line of subverting detente and exacerbating the international situation. It is endeavoring to impose its will on the socialist states and other countries."³

However the USSR--and this has been repeatedly stated on the highest level--in the future will consistently follow its peace-loving foreign policy and steadily struggle to fully implement the accords of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and to check the aggressive forces and reaction. This course has been defined by the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses and has a long-range, principled nature.

In an interview with the newspaper PRAVDA on 13 January 1980, L. I. Brezhnev, in describing the prospects of the struggle for European security, emphasized: "In Europe much can be done that is constructive in favor of peace in the not-distant future, in particular, in line with the coming meeting in Madrid and the proposal

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of the Warsaw Pact countries to hold a conference on military detente and disarmament. We are decisive supporters of strengthening and adding to all that is positive which has been achieved over the years on the European continent by the collective efforts of states, large and small. In the future we will carry out a policy of peace and friendship among peoples. In contrast to the present extremist position of Washington, our policy consists in continuing the talks started in recent years in many areas for the purpose of halting the arms race. This, of course, also touches on the problems of lessening the military confrontation in Europe."⁴

The unswerving determination of the USSR and the other socialist countries to follow this course has gained new vivid expression in the work and the results of the meeting of the Warsaw Pact PCC held on 14-15 May 1980 in the capital of socialist Poland.

The meeting which was held during the days of the 25th jubilee celebration of the Warsaw Pact put forward major peace initiatives which should, as was pointed out in the document of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers, provide a new, strong impetus to the process of detente.

"The strength of our party," said L. I. Brezhnev in his speech on 15 May 1980 in Warsaw, "lies in the fraternal unity of our countries, our parties, our peoples and in our loyalty to the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism and the principles of socialist internationalism. The strength of our party lies in the fact that it meets the vital interests of hundreds of millions of people throughout the world, of everyone who needs peace and not war...."⁵

FOOTNOTES

1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim Kursom" [By the Leninist Course], Speeches and Articles, Vol 5, Moscow, 1976, p 339.
2. PRAVDA, 23 February 1980.
3. Ibid.
4. PRAVDA, 13 January 1980.
5. PRAVDA, 16 May 1980.

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Military Detente: An Urgent Task of the Present Time

Having approved the basic principles which will guide the signatory states in their mutual relations, the European-wide conference created a good foundation not only for developing broader cooperation and mutually advantageous ties. At the same time a solid basis was put down for extending detente into the military area. Thus, a strategic area was pointed out for further efforts aimed at the final elimination of the threat of wars in Europe.

Of course, the unswerving observance of the approved principles of state relationships by all the conference participants is an indispensable condition for greater trust among them, and this, in turn, is extremely important for subsequent steps which involve security interests. But another thing is also obvious: factors favorable to the cause of peace in no way lead automatically to military detente. They merely open up real opportunities for the approval of specific measures in the given area.

There is also another interdependence: each success in the area of military detente helps to strengthen political detente, since without implementing the military detente measures the process of improving political relations between the states can be impeded.

The concept of "military detente" encompasses a number of areas which are largely interrelated. The basic specific components of military detente were clearly formulated in the Decree of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers "On the Results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe" of 7 August 1975. Here are these components: the reduction and then the halting of the arms race, advancement along a path leading to universal and complete disarmament; the reduction of the military confrontation on the European continent; the overcoming of the division of Europe into opposing military blocs.

The European-wide conference, as is known, was not specially concerned with the specific questions of disarmament and the military situation in Europe. But, in examining the problems of security and cooperation, the conference paid attention as well to certain questions which relate to the military here: the questions of strengthening stability and trust.

At the conference, and this was stated in the Final Act, important measures were approved aimed at strengthening trust and stability. They all help to reduce the danger of the outbreak of an armed conflict in Europe, and most importantly prevent an incorrect understanding or incorrect assessment of military activities by one or another state. This can occur, in particular, under conditions where the member states lack clear and prompt information on the nature of the military activities of other states.

Here is a striking example that it is a question of measures which are of exceptionally great significance. On 9 November 1979, at the headquarters of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) in Colorado Springs, Colorado, an alert was announced of an "assumed nuclear attack on the United States." Fighter interceptors took to the air upon command from air bases in Oregon, Michigan and the Canadian

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Province of British Columbia. The missile bases in the United States were brought to a state of combat readiness. Only 6 minutes later was it established that the alert announced by the NORAD early warning system was erroneous and an order followed to countermand it.

The UPI Agency pointed out at that time that if the alert had lasted 1 minute longer, the warning of a "nuclear attack" on the United States would have reached President J. Carter who could have given the order for the take-off of nuclear bombers and preparations to launch the intercontinental missiles.

Among the measures relating to trust and stability, the Final Act provides, in the first place, preliminary notification of major military exercises. It goes without saying that such exercises, particularly those conducted near frontiers, can actually cause definite concern in neighboring states and this should be eliminated as much as possible in the interests of strengthening mutual understanding.¹

An accord was reached that "notification will be given of major military exercises by ground forces with a total number of over 25,000 men conducted independently or jointly with any possible air force or navy components (in this context the word 'troops' includes amphibious and airborne troops). In the event of independent exercises of amphibious or airborne troops or joint exercises in which they are involved, the designated troops will also be included in this number."²

Another aspect of the same measure concerns the zones where exercises requiring notification are conducted. It was provided that "notification will be given on major military exercises which are conducted in Europe on the territory of any signatory state, as well, if applicable, in the adjacent maritime area and airspace. In the event that the territory of the signatory state extends beyond limit, preliminary notification should be given only for exercises which are conducted within 250 km of its frontier facing any other European signatory state or common to it."

This means that the states participating in the conference--with the exception of the USSR and Turkey--would notify each other of major military exercises conducted on any part of the territory of European states. For the USSR and Turkey, notification zones were established within the limits of 250 km from their frontiers facing any other European signatory state or common with it.³

As for the time of notification for major military exercises, an accord was reached that notification of such military exercises would be sent 21 days or more before the start or upon the closest opportunity before the date of its start, if the exercise is set in a shorter time. The notification will contain information about the name, if such is to be assigned, the general purpose of the exercise, the states involved in it, the type of types and the number of involved troops, the region and the proposed date for conducting it. The signatory states will also, if possible, provide the appropriate additional information, in particular, that concerning the components of the participating forces and the time for using these forces.

The importance of such an accord on preliminary notification of major military exercises is emphasized by the fact that never before was such a practice achieved in international relations. Undoubtedly such a procedure will help to strengthen mutual trust.

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The Soviet Union has unfailingly carried out the accord of the Final Act--like all its remaining provisions--on preliminary notification of major military exercises. In those instances when military exercises were conducted in the USSR within the parameters stipulated by the Final Act, preliminary notification of them was given.

For the sake of objectivity, it must be said that the other participants of the European-wide conference more than 50 times have given notification on military exercises conducted by them, and such countries as Hungary, Norway, the FRG, Sweden, Denmark and a number of others have sometimes provided notification on exercises involving less than 25,000 men, the number provided by the Helsinki Accords.

Another measure of trust and stability stated in the Final Act is the exchange of observers at exercises by the armed forces of the signatory states, including those with different social systems. This is a rather new matter. In the past, in particular in the 1930's, there were individual instances of reciprocal invitations by states for observers to attend military maneuvers, but an agreement on a European-wide scale never existed in this area.

The inviting of observers to major exercises is a manifestation of good will by the state conducting the exercise, and for this reason notification of them does not mean the automatic inviting of observers. Obviously it would be advisable to invite first observers from neighboring countries to major national exercises.

The accord reached on this question states that one or another state in each individual instance is to determine whether or not it will send invitations to other signatory states. In the affirmative case, it will determine the number of observers, the procedure and conditions of their participation and provide other information which it feels useful. It will also provide the appropriate conditions for the invited persons and extend them hospitality.

Thus, the accord on the inviting of observers to military observers--like, incidentally, the other measures of stability and trust--rests on a voluntary basis.

The steps of the USSR, as any other sovereign state, on this question have been determined by specific circumstances. Here are the facts.

1976. Invited to the "Kavkaz" [Caucasus] Exercise conducted from 25 January through 6 February were observers from the signatory states located in Southeast Europe: Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia.

In the same year, from 14 through 18 June, the "Sever" [North] Exercises were held. This time invitations were sent to the countries located near the region where they were held, that is, Norway, the GDR, Poland, Finland and Sweden.

1977. Invited to the "Karpaty" [Carpathians] Exercises (11-16 July) were the representatives of the FRG, GDR, Austria, Bulgaria, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

1978. Invited to the "Berezina" Exercises (6-10 February) were the representatives of Belgium, the GDR, FRG, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, England, the United States, France, Czechoslovakia and Switzerland.

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Incidentally, in the practice of invitations for foreign observers to military exercises there have been instances when for various reasons one or another signatory state refrained from accepting the invitation. Thus, Luxembourg did not send an observer to the "Berezina" Exercises. This, certainly, did not cause any condemnation or criticism from the USSR.

A third "measure of trust and stability" is the exchange of military personnel, including visits by military delegations. It was assumed that the signatory states, again acting voluntarily, could achieve better mutual understanding and this would aid their common objectives on the questions of strengthening peace.

Within this accord, the contacts of the USSR with other states have noticeably increased. Such a conclusion is confirmed by data for the second half of 1979.

In July, Odessa was visited by the Italian Navy destroyer "Impavodi." At the end of August of the same year, the Soviet Union was visited by a delegation of French military pilots from the famous "Normandie--Neman" Air Regiment. Contacts between Soviet and French aviators have already become a tradition. As was pointed out in the communique, this visit was carried out "within normal bilateral relations between the air forces of the two countries."

In September, a detachment of ships from the Swedish Navy arrived in Leningrad. In November, the commander of the Swedish Ground Forces, Lt Gen N. Skjold, paid an official visit to the Soviet Union.

During the past, visits were also made by Soviet military delegations to signatory countries of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In September, Finland was visited by a delegation from the USSR General Staff, and in October Helsinki was visited by representatives from the Leningrad Higher Naval School imeni M. V. Frunze.

One should also point out such a form of strengthening trust as the organizing in September 1979 by the USSR Ministry of Defense of a trip to Kiev for foreign air force attaches during which they visited the Kiev Higher Air School.

All of this makes it possible to conclude that the approved measures as a whole have been not badly carried out and actually contribute to the growth of trust in the military area. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries in deed have shown that they are faithful to the Helsinki Accords.

In acting in the spirit of the Final Act, the Soviet Union has consistently come forward with specific initiatives the realization of which would lead to progress on the question of military detente in Europe and throughout the world. These initiatives were contained in a number of speeches by L. I. Brezhnev and in the documents of the Soviet government and the Warsaw Pact. Let us mention the most important ones.

On 21 October 1977, L. I. Brezhnev, in his speech in the Kremlin, put forward a program for military detente. This was a platform of actions which would supplement political detente with military detente. Its basic provisions came down to the following:

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In the first place, to conclude between the participants of the European-wide conference a treaty on not being the first to use nuclear weapons against each other;

Secondly, to agree at least not to expand the membership of the opposing military-political groupings and alliances in Europe;

Thirdly, to consistently carry out such measures envisaged by the Helsinki Final Act as notification of major military exercises, the inviting of observers to certain of them and the exchange of military delegations; moreover, to agree not to conduct exercises above a certain level, for example, 50,000-60,000 men;

Fourthly, if the countries in the southern part of the Mediterranean basin desired that the military measures of trust provided in the Final Act would also extend to this region adjacent to Europe, to give consideration to this;

Fifthly, to discuss all these problems thoroughly in the near future, in parallel with continuing the Vienna talks, at special consultations jointly by all participating states in the European-wide conference.⁴

This platform of actions envisages, as is seen by a comparison of it with the provisions of the Final Act, a significant quantitative and qualitative broadening of the scope of already active confidence measures. It was actively supported by the Warsaw Pact states. Broad circles of the progressive community in all the countries participating in the Helsinki conference also supported it.

The Soviet delegation advanced these proposals for review at the meeting of the representatives of the signatory states in Belgrad on 4 October 1977--9 March 1978. However, the United States and the other NATO countries were unwilling to examine these truly important, constructive initiatives.

Such a position by the NATO countries certainly did not halt the efforts of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries to further work out peace initiatives aimed at ensuring detente on the European continent.

In full accord with the requirements of the Final Act, in being guided by a sincere desire to strengthen European and international security, the Soviet Union, along with the other Warsaw Pact countries, in May 1978 put forward a number of important proposals. The particular feature of them is that they lie as it were on the boundary area of political and military areas of detente. They provide treaty law measures which, without being disarmament in the direct understanding of this word, create a more favorable basis for practical steps to reduce the military confrontation and to lessen the possibility of military clashes between states.

The Moscow (1978) Declaration approved at a meeting of the Warsaw Pact PCC proposed the implementing of the following measures:

- 1) The concluding of a world treaty on the renunciation of force in international relations. This treaty would envisage an obligation of all states to renounce the use of force or the threat of force in all its forms and manifestations, including a ban on the use of nuclear weapons;

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- 2) The strict carrying out by all signatory states of the obligation not to employ force or the threat of force in relations with one another;
- 3) The carrying out of proposals that all signatory states would assume the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other and that the NATO and Warsaw Pact states would not broaden the membership of both alliances;
- 4) Measures to strengthen the guarantees for the security of nonnuclear states, including the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons against states which do not possess nuclear weapons and do not have them on their territory and equally the renunciation of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of states where they presently do not exist.⁵

It was perfectly apparent that all these initiatives--naturally, in the event of their implementation--would help to overcome the dividing of Europe into blocs, and the preventing of this had been a constant aim for the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries for many years.

In May 1979, the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee again proposed that practical steps be taken the implementation of which would make it possible to rise to a new level in strengthening trust between the states, to achieve political detente and integrate it with military detente.

As an essential step aimed at achieving these objectives, the Warsaw Pact countries proposed that a treaty be concluded between all the signatory states on not being the first to employ either nuclear or conventional weapons against each other. The concluding of such a treaty would fundamentally strengthen the political and legal foundation for observing the principle of the renunciation of force or the threat of force in Europe, it would raise its effectiveness and thereby create new guarantees against the unleashing of military conflicts on the European continent.

At the same time the Warsaw Pact countries stated that they were ready:

- 1) To agree on preliminary notification of significant troop movements in Europe and on large-scale air force and naval exercises conducted close to the territorial waters of other Helsinki signatories;
- 2) To agree on the nonextension of military-political groupings in Europe, on limiting the level of military exercises and on extending the confidence measures to the region of the Mediterranean.

Particular attention among the governments and public in the West was focused on the proposal of the Warsaw Pact countries to convene a conference on the political level with the participation of all the European states, the United States and Canada for reviewing specific steps for the purposes of lessening the military confrontation and advancing military detente in Europe.

Seemingly, having in front of them such an extensive range of proposals by the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies, the Western Helsinki signatories would act as the Helsinki Accords require and to which their signatures were affixed. Certainly no one could dispute the fact that all the mentioned proposals conformed to the spirit

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of the Final Act which urged that everything necessary be done to ensure the development of European international relations along a path of the consistent strengthening of peaceful coexistence and the supplementing of political detente by military detente.

Unfortunately, by the end of 1979, the question of the further development of international relations in Europe had not only not approached its solution, but, on the contrary, had taken on particular acuteness. This was due to the plans to produce and deploy on the territory of a number of the Western European NATO states qualitatively new American medium-range nuclear missiles aimed at the USSR and its allies.

The carrying out of these militaristic plans would substantially alter the strategic situation in Europe, as this would shatter the equilibrium existing on the continent between the military forces of the two social systems, socialist and capitalist. Certainly the Warsaw Pact which would never permit NATO military superiority would be forced to take measures in response and a new increase in the arms race would be inevitable.

In order not to permit such a dangerous development of events for the cause of European and universal peace, the USSR, together with its Warsaw Pact allies, showed true political boldness and set an example of good will, having proposed, it can be said, a program for strengthening peace in Europe. This, without exaggeration, historic initiative was contained in the speech given by L. I. Brezhnev on 6 October 1979, in Berlin during the days of celebrating the 30th anniversary of the GDR.

The contents of the Program for the Strengthening of Peace in Europe encompass all the basic aspects of military detente. It contains an appeal:

a) To reduce the number of nuclear weapons on the European land. An effective way to this exists, and the Soviet Union has stated its readiness to do its part. Moreover, as a gesture of good will, the Soviet Union expressed a readiness to unilaterally reduce, in comparison with the present level, the number of medium-range nuclear weapons deployed in the western regions of the USSR, but, of course, only in the event that Western Europe would not deploy additional medium-range nuclear weapons.

Simultaneously the Soviet Union proposed an immediate start to talks on reducing medium-range nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. It was also stipulated that the previously made proposals to pull out of the Mediterranean the Soviet and American ships capable of carrying nuclear weapons would remain in effect and that the USSR supported the plan proposed by the President of Finland U. Kekkonen to turn Northern Europe into a nuclear-free zone.

b) To renounce--for all states participating in the European conference--the use of both nuclear and nonnuclear weapons against one another. In this regard it was clearly stated that the Soviet Union would never begin to employ nuclear weapons against those states which refused the production or acquisition of such weapons and did not have them on their territory. The Soviet Union was ready to draw up a corresponding obligation with any interested state.

c) To reduce the armed forces and weapons in Central Europe, an issue which had been under discussion in Vienna since 1973. In order to make headway in these talks

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and give them a new impetus, the Soviet Union took the decision--with the agreement of the GDR leadership and after consultation with the other Warsaw Pact members--to unilaterally reduce the number of Soviet troops in Central Europe (specifically it was a question of pulling back up to 20,000 Soviet servicemen, 1,000 tanks as well as a definite quantity of other military equipment from GDR territory onto Soviet territory within a period of 12 months).

d) To carry out measures aimed at strengthening trust, such as: to provide notification on major troop exercises of ground forces not 21 days before, as had been agreed upon in Helsinki, but a longer period before, and not on a level of 25,000 men but rather 20,000; not to conduct exercises involving more than 40,000-50,000 servicemen; to provide notification on major air force exercises and naval maneuvers conducted close to the territorial waters of the other signatory states; to provide preliminary notification on movements of ground forces numbering more than 20,000 men in the zone defined in the Helsinki Act.

The Soviet Union considered a European-wide political conference on military detente and disarmament to be the most appropriate place for discussing the broad range of measures relating to military detente and hence confidence-building measures.

The carrying out of the program for strengthening peace in Europe as proposed on 6 October 1979 would not provide any unilateral advantages for the USSR or any other socialist country. All the nations of the continent would gain from its realization. The military threat in Europe would be reduced and a lessening of tension would be deepened and broadened.

The program for the strengthening of peace in Europe proposed on 6 October 1979 in Berlin was unanimously supported by the fraternal socialist countries.⁶ A session of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee held on 5-6 December in the capital of the GDR noted that the new initiatives contained in the speech of L. I. Brezhnev of 6 October 1979 were a major contribution to solving the problems of military detente on the European continent.

On behalf of their states, the ministers participating in the session appealed to the governments of the NATO nations to reexamine the situation which existed in Europe and not to undertake actions which would complicate the situation on the continent. At the same time it was stated that the taking of the decision by the NATO Council to produce and deploy the new types of American medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe and the acting on such a decision would destroy the basis for talks.

The ministers had grounds for such a statement as the preliminary taking of a decision for a "build-up" would mean an attempt by NATO to conduct the talks from a "position of strength." This was fully and frankly admitted by the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint NATO Forces in Europe, Gen B. Rogers, who stated: "In order to be able to conduct successful talks (with the USSR--Author), we must have strength. We can obtain it by a decision to produce and deploy the new weapons." But the Western powers knew and had been repeatedly convinced that talks from a "position of strength" were fundamentally unacceptable for the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact states.

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The final document, a communique, from the session of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers reaffirmed the peace-lovingness of the socialist states and their desire, along with all the states which had signed the Final Act in Helsinki, to make detente a continuous process which was evermore viable and universal in scope and to strengthen security and peace in Europe.

Very significant was the fact that precisely on the opening day of the session, 5 December 1979, the first Soviet troop formations numbering 9,500 men along with their weapons and military equipment began to pull out of GDR territory in full accord with the announcement made by L. I. Brezhnev on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the formation of the GDR.

The pulling out of Soviet troops was not a manifestation of weakness and not a propaganda ploy. Any attempts to distort the objectives and essence of this peace-loving step are doomed to failure. By its actions the Soviet Union opened up the way for practical measures to supplement political detente with military detente.

The foreign ministers' session felt it necessary to reaffirm a number of important proposals which had been put forward in the Moscow declaration of the PCC of 23 November 1978, including:

- 1) The concluding between all the signatory states of a treaty not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against each other;
- 2) To observe the principle of the renunciation of force or the threat of force in Europe;
- 3) Not to extend the membership of the North Atlantic bloc and the Warsaw Pact;
- 4) To agree to the simultaneous disbanding of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and as a first step, to eliminating their military organizations, starting with a reciprocal reduction in military activities.

The session of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers also proposed a number of specific measures in the area of military detente in Europe. Some of them clarified already known proposals by the socialist countries and others were made for the first time.

Among the important initiatives which were further developed and made more concrete, at the session a special place was held by the proposal to convene a European-wide political conference on military detente and disarmament.

The subject of discussion at the conference was clearly defined: this could be both measures to strengthen trust between the states in Europe as well as measures aimed at reducing the concentration and curtailing armed forces and weapons on the continent.

The participants at the session voiced the view that the examination of the corresponding questions and the approval of specific accords on them should be carried out stage by stage, beginning with the simpler measures and moving step by step to the more important and more profound ones.

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The work of the conference should be organized in such a manner so as to form a succession from one stage to another in achieving progress in the area of the measures to strengthen confidence, to lessen the military confrontation, to reduce the concentration and curtail the armed forces and weapons as well as other disarmament measures. Here the aim was that progress in one area would create greater opportunities for achieving success in other areas.

The first stage of the conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe should focus work on the confidence-building measures, considering that the conference would be concerned with real disarmament measures in the second stage.

The preparations for the conference, in the opinion of the session participants, should be carried out in relation to the measures being implemented within the framework of the European-wide process, the most immediate being the forthcoming Madrid meeting of representatives from the signatory states. They felt that consultations between all the signatory states should play a substantial role in achieving general agreement on the convening of the conference and its preparations. Such consultations conducted on a bilateral basis could then, as experience of preparing for the European-wide conference has shown, be shifted to a multilateral basis. It was the conviction of the session participants that this should be done as quickly as possible to convene a multilateral preparatory working meeting in the first half of 1980.

The recommendations resulting from the preparatory work on the basic questions of organizing the conference, including the agenda of its first stage, could be reviewed at the Madrid Meeting of the signatory states in the aim of approving final decisions on the convening and procedure for conducting the conference.

The states represented at the session urged all the participants of the Helsinki Conference to carefully study the above-given considerations concerning the objectives, contents and procedure of work for the conference on European detente and disarmament in Europe and on its preparations and to respond affirmatively to them in order to begin to reach agreement on these questions. In this manner a new real step was taken to strengthen mutual confidence, security and peace in Europe.

Why is military detente in the center of the European continent today more vitally necessary than ever before? This question could be briefly answered as follows: it is extremely dangerous that Europe continues to be a "powder keg," for the continent is literally "larded" with the most modern types of weapons.

Europe is a comparatively small part of the world. In territory it is almost 3-fold smaller than Africa and 4-fold smaller than Asia and America. But nowhere else in the world are there so many nuclear and atomic weapons concentrated as on the European continent. According to the data of the bourgeois press, in Europe there are over 3 million soldiers of the Western European countries alone comprising 56 army divisions and more than 150 regiments, over 750 fighting ships and more than 2,500 combat aircraft. More than 8,000 nuclear warheads and more than 3,000 carriers are located at American bases and military installations in Western Europe.

The Helsinki Conference affirmed the importance of solving the problem of reducing armed forces and weapons in Europe, stating in the Final Act: "The participating

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states recognize the interest of all of them in the efforts aimed at reducing military confrontation...."⁷ The nations which signed the Final Act expressed their conviction of the need to take effective measures in this area.

Even in the course of the preparatory consultations (31 January--28 June 1973), the basic principles were set out for solving the problems of reducing armed forces and weapons. These were: the nonimpairment of the security of any of the parties, reciprocity of reductions and their coverage of both troop personnel as well as weaponry. Then also the objective of the talks was set, namely, to reach an agreement on reducing the concentration of troops in the center of the continent and thereby advance the cause of detente in the military area.

An accord was reached that 11 states would participate in the discussion of the problem. These were: the Soviet Union, Poland, the GDR and Czechoslovakia as well as the United States, England, Canada, the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. These 11 states which would be termed the direct participants at the talks would have the right to participate in taking decisions on the essence of the cut-back questions. The decisions would be taken on the basis of general agreement (the consensus of 11 states). The other eight nations which participated in the preliminary consultations were Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Greece, Denmark, Italy, Norway and Turkey. They would receive special status which gave them the right, without participating in decision taking, to make their contribution to the course of the discussion, in particular to distribute documents on the questions under discussion.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist nations were in favor of allowing all the European states so desiring to participate in the talks, including neutral states, as the solution to the question of reducing armed forces should not be the prerogative of the existing military-political alliances in Europe. However, since the Western nations were against broadening the range of possible participants in the talks, the socialist countries did not insist on their proposal and reserved the right to raise this question subsequently.

The talks opened in Vienna in October 1973. On 8 November of the same year, the socialist countries submitted for discussion a draft agreement which, in full accord with the provisions agreed upon in the course of the preliminary consultations, envisaged a reduction in the armies of the USSR, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia as well as the United States, Great Britain, the FRG, the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada and Luxembourg by 20,000 men in 1975, by 5 percent in 1976 and by another 10 percent in 1977.

Thus, the proposals of the Warsaw Pact countries envisaged a reduction in both the foreign and national armed forces and weapons at strictly agreed-upon dates. The ground and air forces and their weapons, including nuclear weapons, would be subject to reduction. As a whole the reduction was to be carried out in three stages in order to reduce the armed forces and weapons in Central Europe by approximately 17 percent in 1975-1977.

The counterproposals of the Western Powers had a fundamentally different nature. The "scheme for troop reductions" introduced by them on 22 November 1973 came down to limiting the reduction only to ground forces, and in an unequal proportion which

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was detrimental to the socialist states. The NATO armed forces were to be reduced almost 3-fold less than the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact states.

The scheme did not indicate what Western states were to reduce their troops, in what amount or by what time. The Western scheme disregarded a reduction in air forces and nuclear weapons, as if it was not apparent that precisely these forces represented the greatest threat to the densely populated regions of Europe. The reduction involved only the ground forces and was to be carried out in two stages. In the first stage, agreements were to be reached on reducing the ground forces of only the USSR and the United States stationed in Central Europe. After the carrying out of this measure, the second phase was to begin where it would be a question of reducing the ground forces of the other participants in the talks.

Thus, the reduction scheme proposed by the Western countries was aimed at obtaining unilateral advantages and did not conform to the approved objective of the talks which was a reciprocal reduction of armed forces and weapons. In essence, it envisaged a change in the existing balance of forces in Central Europe in favor of the Western countries.

In full accord with the letter and spirit of the Final Act and in the aim of advancing the talks and bringing them to practical ends, on 19 February 1976, the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies put forward a proposal which took into account a number of requests of the Western partners. The essence of the new proposals was that in 1976, there should be reductions by an equal percentage in the troops of just the USSR and the United States out of the total number of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, while the level of the armed forces of the other participants in the talks would be "frozen" and reduced in the second stage, in 1977 and 1978. These proposals also gave a specific number of Soviet and American tanks, nuclear weapons-carrying aircraft and missile launchers which would be cut back along with a definite number of nuclear ammunition for these delivery systems.

It was important that the new initiatives by the socialist countries envisaged a reduction of both the ground forces and the air force, including nuclear weapons, with the understanding that this would include both personnel, the weapons and the military equipment. The socialist nations proceeded from the view that proposals based on a different approach such as on a reduction of selective, individual components, as the Western powers sought hoping to obtain unilateral military advantages for themselves, could not comprise a basis for a mutually acceptable agreement.

As in all the other instances of the advancing of initiatives by the socialist countries at the Vienna talks, these proposals conformed fully to the principle of nonimpairment of the security of anyone; they envisaged an equal reduction which would not lead to an altering of the balance of forces in the region of Central Europe in favor of any of the participants in the talks.

The specific obligations in the agreement on the first stage of reductions were made in detail only for the USSR and the United States, while the remaining states who participated directly in the talks in the first stage would "freeze" the number of their armed forces and limit themselves only to obligations of a general sort on their reductions in the second stage. Certainly the purpose was a "freezing" which would in fact not allow an increase in the number of armed forces in the

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states possessing troops in Central Europe. This must be emphasized particularly due to the fact in recent years there have been obvious attempts to increase the national armed forces and weapons in individual European NATO countries as well as shift armed forces and weapons from the United States to Europe.

In describing these proposals, L. I. Brezhnev stated at the 25th CPSU Congress: "Our proposals are based on the only realistic foundation for maintaining the balance of forces which has come into being in the center of Europe, in essence, an equilibrium. Their realization will not harm the security of a single country. It would be hoped that this would encounter a due response among the Western countries and that it would be possible to finally move from discussions to realistic measures aimed at reducing armed forces and weapons."⁸

Being unable to refute the objective and just nature of the proposals by the socialist countries, Western propaganda began to stress that the stumbling block in the talks was the refusal of the socialist countries to name the number of troops stationed in the area of reduction. The socialist countries convincingly showed that it was not a question of figures but rather one of reaching agreement on the key questions of the cut-back upon which the working out of the agreement primarily depended.

Nevertheless, in endeavoring to provide progress at the talks, the socialist states accommodated the Western Nations. On 10 June 1976, numerical data were provided on the total number of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries in Central Europe and on the number of ground forces stationed there. The figures, respectively, were 987,300 and 805,000 (on 1 April 1976).⁹ The NATO representatives in Vienna, in turn, announced that their nations had stationed in Central Europe armed forces numbering 981,000, including 791,000 ground forces.¹⁰

These figures convincingly confirm that in Central Europe an approximate equilibrium had developed in the number of personnel from the armed forces of the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations.

However, the NATO countries as before sought unilateral advantages for themselves to the detriment of security for the socialist countries. For example, they proposed that the Soviet Union pull an entire tank army out of the reduction zone. In response they promised a selective pull-out of 29,000 servicemen and a certain quantity of American nuclear weapons deployed in Central Europe.

Seemingly it should be clear to anyone that the approved principles of reciprocity and nonimpairment could not be observed if noncompatible troop elements are reduced, if one magnitude of reduction, that is, troop formations, is used for some states and another, that is, individual servicemen from different units, is applied for others. In the first instance, when it is a question of the socialist states, the Western nations propose a true troop reduction. But for themselves they provide a "reduction procedure" which would fully serve the purposes of reorganizing and modernizing the troops. For example, without harming their combat readiness, the reduction could be made from service personnel (barbers, cooks and so forth).

The proposed reduction in a certain portion of the American nuclear weapons in Central Europe did not alter the essence of the matter. It was known that, outside

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the scope of the Vienna talks, there was a plan to modernize the American nuclear weapons and their deployment system under which a certain number of obsolete types of U.S. nuclear weapons could be withdrawn from the center of the European continent. And where was the guarantee that such a withdrawal would not be compensated for by an increase in the nuclear weapons of the Western European NATO members?

In the opinion of the socialist countries, a reduction in nuclear weapons should not have the nature of a limited, single action, as the Western countries had insisted. The components of the nuclear weapons should be reduced in both stages by all states possessing these components. A situation could not be permitted whereby any of the states which possessed, for example, nuclear weapons delivery systems would maintain their freedom to increase these weapons, while other participants to the agreement would reduce them.

During the entire period of the Vienna talks, the socialist countries repeatedly and convincingly showed good will and a readiness to reach agreement. At the beginning of 1975, they had made a proposal that all the direct participants in the talks would assume an obligation not to increase the size of their armed forces in Central Europe during the talks. The importance of such an obligation is hard to overestimate as it would help to improve the situation in Europe, to strengthen confidence between the participants in the talks and to create conditions for reaching accord on troop reductions. This proposal by the socialist states was on the agenda of the talks. However, the NATO countries, without accepting it, continued from time to time to raise a propaganda campaign over the increase in the Soviet troops in Central Europe. Under this pretext they increased their own armed forces in this region (for example, in 1976 alone, two additional mechanized brigades were created in the American troops and one division in the FRG troops).

"In contrast to the NATO countries, for a long time we have not increased our armed forces in Central Europe and we do not intend--and I want to emphasize this strongly--we do not intend to increase them in the future by a single soldier or a single tank,"¹¹ stated L. I. Brezhnev.

In April 1978, the NATO countries made certain changes in their scheme. For example, they agreed to set dates for the reduction of the troops of the European nations and Canada in the second stage. However, as a whole their approach remained unaltered.

In endeavoring to get the talks off dead center, the Soviet Union and the other socialist states which were direct participants in the Vienna talks (the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia) on 8 June 1978 came forward with new important proposals, the essence of which came down to the following:

In the first place, as a result of the reductions equal collective levels should be established in the sizes of the armed forces of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in Central Europe with 900,000 men in each, including 700,000 in the ground forces; secondly, the reduction in the armed forces personnel should be limited to the ground forces, while only an upper limit should be set for the number of personnel in the air force, that is, the air force levels would be "frozen";

Thirdly, in the first stage, when only the USSR and United States would reduce their troops, a selective reduction and limitation of weapons would be carried out, and

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for those types which were named by the Western side (the USSR would reduce the number of tanks and the United States would reduce a certain number of nuclear ammunition and certain types of delivery systems);

Fourthly, in the first stage the reduction of Soviet troops would be carried out with those formations which had been proposed by the West, that is, by divisions;

Fifthly, the reduction of Soviet and American troops would be carried out proportionately to their numbers in Central Europe, as the NATO countries had sought.

A new manifestation of good will by the socialist states was their proposals of 30 November 1978 not to increase the size of the armed forces of the participating states during the Vienna talks. Such an accord would be based on collective (within both military groupings) or individual obligations.

In the aim of bringing the positions of the parties closer together and facilitating the reaching of agreement for the West, the socialist countries made yet another step toward the NATO states. On 28 June 1979, the delegations of the GDR, Poland, the USSR and Czechoslovakia, upon instructions from their governments, made a proposal which envisaged that all the direct participants both from the West and from the East would assume an obligation in the agreement to reduce their ground forces to equal collective levels of 700,000 each and that each of them would make a substantial contribution to the achieving of this goal, being approximately proportional to the total number of its forces in the region of action of the agreement. At the same time, considering the position of the Western countries, the proposal pointed out that the individual amounts of the cut-back of troops would be determined by each individual participant to the agreement within the limits of the corresponding alliance: in NATO for the Western countries and in the Warsaw Pact for the socialist ones.¹²

In endeavoring to establish the necessity of an unbalanced reduction in the armed forces in Europe in favor of the West, the bourgeois press and the representatives of the West in the talks continue to emphasize the so-called geographic factor. They argue thus: if one of the subunits of American troops is pulled back 3,000 miles, then for maintaining equilibrium the Soviet Union should pull back six of the same subunits, as they will be moved back just 500 miles. But if one takes a more objective and broader look at the "geographic factor," the picture is somewhat different.

The Soviet Union, in possessing enormously long ground frontiers, is forced to keep the corresponding forces for their defense not only in the west, but also in the east and in the south of the nation. For this reason, if the Soviet Union has to move its troops to the west, for example, from beyond the Urals or from beyond Baykal, these distances would be greater than, for example, from New York to London.

As is known, the organizational development of the armed forces in the region of the proposed reduction was carried out by the nations directly participating in the Vienna talks over the entire postwar period in accord with the interests of their security. Understandably, the parties took the "geographic factor" into account among many others and this was done long before the start of the talks in Vienna. This circumstance was considered in the course of the preparatory consultations which outlined the region of the reduction and thereby terminated a discussion

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of the question of the "geographic factor." To involve it in the discussion meant to attempt to distract the participants of the talks from discussing urgent problems.

A real way out of the blind alley in which the Vienna talks found themselves was provided by the new important proposals advanced on 10 July 1980 by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries directly involved in the talks.

The socialist countries, considering the proposals of their Western partners, proposed a reduction in the number of Soviet and American troops in this region during the first stage by 20,000 Soviet servicemen and 13,000 American ones. This proposed reduction did not include the 20,000 Soviet servicemen and 1,000 tanks which had been withdrawn from the GDR unilaterally.

Moreover, the socialist nations proposed a compromise procedure for maintaining the collective levels of the number of Warsaw Pact and NATO troops in Central Europe and which should be established as a result of the two stages of reduction. With this procedure, on the one hand, consideration was given to the demand of the Warsaw Pact nations that individual nations would not infinitely increase the size of their troops in the future. On the other hand, the desire of the Western participants in the talks was observed of not imposing individual restraints on the size of the armies of one or another nation in establishing the same level of armed forces for both military-political groupings.

The socialist nations stated that in the event of a positive response to their proposals by the NATO nations they were ready to immediately begin to work out the text of the agreement on the first stage.

General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev, in speaking at the Helsinki Conference, pointed out: "Precisely the materialization of detente is the essence of the question.... And here we put the focus on the task of preventing an arms race and achieving real results on the question of disarmament."¹³

The time which has passed since this speech has been full of a constant and purposeful struggle by the Soviet Union to make progress on the question of disarmament. "No nation," L. I. Brezhnev rightly pointed out, "has presented mankind with such a broad, concrete and realistic program aimed at lessening and then fully eliminating the danger of a new war as has the Soviet Union."

The Soviet Union is guided by a carefully elaborated and weighed concept of disarmament, which is an extremely complicated and multi-level problem as it involves the fundamental interests of states, including their national security.

The approach of the USSR to this problem has a comprehensive, all-encompassing character. Soviet foreign policy, in being realistic, considers that the achieving of this goal requires great efforts and time. In working for the most radical measures, the Soviet Union at the same time seeks opportunities for partial, intermediate measures. Such a realistic approach makes it possible, without overlooking the main objective of universal and complete disarmament, of achieving a practical, piecemeal resolution of this problem.

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In the foreign policy program approved by the 25th CPSU Congress, in representing an organic continuation and development of the historic Peace Program, the following task was clearly formulated: "to achieve a halt in the growing arms race which is dangerous for peace and a transition to a reduction in the stockpiled weapons and to disarmament."¹⁵

With the ratification of the new USSR Constitution (Basic Law) on 7 October 1977, the struggle for "achieving universal and full disarmament" was elevated to the rank of a state law of the USSR.

In the extensive and diverse problem of disarmament, the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states consider nuclear disarmament to be the most important and immediate task, for precisely the nuclear weapons represent the greatest danger for mankind. There has certainly been no other area of disarmament in which the socialist nations would have put forward such important and constructive proposals as in the nuclear area, clearly realizing that there are many difficulties, including objective ones, on the path to solving this problem.

Nevertheless the Soviet Union is convinced that nuclear disarmament is not only possible but also necessary. This can be seen from the experience of the Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks (SALT).

By the time the Final Act was approved, there already existed the 1974 Vladivostok summit agreement between the USSR and the United States. This opened up an opportunity for limiting the strategic forces of the two nations both in quantitative and qualitative terms. In the course of the talks, the Soviet Union consistently and constructively worked to sign the corresponding documents as rapidly as possible and in strict accord with the principle of equality and equal security for the parties. Both parties were agreed that such documents should include a treaty on strategic arms limitation running up to the year 1985, a 3-year protocol on certain provisional measures which was to be an inseparable part of this treaty as well as a possible joint declaration on the basic directions for further talks on new measures in the area of limiting and then reducing strategic weapons.

In the course of the Soviet-American meetings in Moscow in March 1977, in Geneva of May of the same year, in Washington in September and again in Moscow in April 1978, the Soviet Union steadily, patiently and in a principled manner worked to conclude the practical elaboration of the corresponding documents.

However, the process of talks initially was totally blocked and then serious difficulties arose one after another caused by the United States. The American side placed such demands on the USSR which could only be construed as obtaining unilateral advantages for the United States.

The Carter Administration showed indecisiveness and inconsistency. In giving way to the pressure of the opponents of detente, and primarily from the military-industrial complex, it again and again endeavored to alter in its favor what had already been agreed upon.

In the spring of 1978, in U.S. policy, and this was fully reflected in the SALT talks, there began to be a tendency to link completely different political problems and this also did not aid the successful development of the talks.

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As for the Soviet side, as was emphasized by L. I. Brezhnev on 7 April 1978, the USSR "is in favor of the most rapid achieving of an agreement, but only one which would strictly accord to the principle of equality and equal security and which would truly embody this fundamental principle.... There can be no other solution."¹⁶

The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-2) was signed in June 1979 in Vienna in the course of the talks between L. I. Brezhnev and the U.S. President J. Carter. "An event has occurred," stated L. I. Brezhnev, "which has long been awaited by the Soviet and American peoples, by the peoples of other countries, by everyone who wishes a lasting peace and recognizes the danger of a further rise in nuclear arsenals. In signing this treaty, we help to defend the most sacred right of each man, the right to life."¹⁷

The new treaty and the documents accompanying it provide a range of measures to restrict strategic offensive weapons of the world's two most powerful states both in quantitative and qualitative terms, and are also a good basis for seeking out solutions to other burning issues in the arms race.

The SALT-2 Treaty undoubtedly is the most all-emcompassing and detailed treaty which has ever been signed on arms limitation, and, most importantly, it covers not any peripheral military systems but rather the weapons complexes which comprise the basis of the military might of both countries.

The quantitative reductions provide for the freezing of the number of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launching units, the launching units for submarine-based ballistic missiles (SBBM), heavy bombers as well as air-to-ground ballistic missiles (AGBM) on a level of 2,400 units effective the moment the treaty comes into force, and during 1981 this total ceiling should be lowered to a level of 2,250 units. The treaty also introduces special quantitative limitations on the strategic systems equipped with multiple individually-targetable reentry vehicles (not more than 1,320 units).

The treaty contains around 20 qualitative limitations. These include a limitation on the power of missiles, the possibility of their modernization, a ban on the re-equipping of light ICBM as heavy ones, a ban on the development of high-speed re-loading devices for ICBM launchers and other restrictions.

Of particular significance were the provisions stated in the Joint Soviet-American communique of 18 June 1979 that a world-wide military conflict is not inevitable and at present there is no more important and immediate task for mankind than the halting of the arms race and the preventing of war. Here the sides expressed an intention to make every effort to achieve this goal.

It is fundamentally important, and this is stated in the joint communique, that each of the sides is not to endeavor and will not endeavor in the future to achieve military superiority, as this could only lead to a dangerous instability, giving rise to a higher arms level and not contributing to the security of either side. The carrying out of this agreement is difficult to overestimate from the viewpoint of the prospects of a mutual deterrence of the arms race and the further strengthening of confidence and international security. The principle of equality and equal security stated in the SALT-2 Treaty, combined with the mentioned agreement, creates a good basis for cooperation in the area of disarmament, including nuclear.

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Certainly the SALT-2 Treaty would not put an end to the arms race, but it does become an indisputable brake on it. For this reason the international community with satisfaction took into consideration the common viewpoint voiced by L. I. Brezhnev and J. Carter that the signing of the treaty should have a positive effect on talks relating to other questions involved with the restricting of this race.

An assessment of the SALT-2 Treaty and the other materials related to it was given in the document of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers. "The Vienna meeting marks an important step ahead along the path of improving Soviet-American relations and the entire international-political climate," it points out. "The full realization of the documents signed in Vienna opens up new opportunities to halt the increase in the arsenals of nuclear missiles and to provide their effective quantitative and qualitative limitation. The carrying out of this task would be a new stage in curtailing the nuclear arms race and would open up the path to a substantial arms reduction and to the realization of the highest goal of the complete halting of the production and elimination of the stockpiles of nuclear weapons."¹⁸

The USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko at a press conference on 25 June 1979, in taking up the relationship between the SALT-2 and SALT-3 talks, commented: "...The present treaty creates bridges to the next treaty. We are in favor of not stopping at the achieved level, we are desirous of moving forward, sparing no effort to achieve a further reduction in nuclear missile weapons."¹⁹

The conclusion and realization of the SALT-2 Treaty and its provisions was a good incentive for the presently conducted both multilateral and bilateral Soviet-American talks in the area of arms limitation and disarmament. This applies primarily to the problem of nuclear disarmament.

The Soviet Union, and it is supported by all the Warsaw Pact members, has advanced a concrete, realistic and clear plan for nuclear disarmament. This plan has been stated in the speeches of L. I. Brezhnev and in other documents of the Soviet government and joint statements of the Warsaw Pact countries. The essence of this plan comes down to the following.

A beginning to a real process of nuclear disarmament should be the halting of nuclear weapons production, a ban on the arming of the armed forces of states with them and a stop to the development and creation of new models and types of these weapons. This simple and at the same time effective measure in fact should put an end to the nuclear arms race and become a dependable basis for subsequent nuclear disarmament measures.

Directly after the halting of nuclear weapons production there should follow measures to reduce their stockpiles with the turning over of the freed nuclear materials to the peaceful sectors of the economy.

The ultimate aim of the reduction is the complete elimination of all types of nuclear weapons, strategic and tactical, offensive and defensive. Along with the stockpiles of nuclear charges, warheads and bombs, there should be a reduction (by disassembly or turning over for use for peaceful purposes) in the delivery systems, that is, the missiles, launchers, bombers, submarines and surface vessels.

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To free all mankind from the unforeseen consequences and instability related to a continuation of the nuclear arms race and from enormous expenditures--this is the goal of this plan.

In November 1977, the year of its 60th anniversary, the Soviet Union made an appeal to the nuclear states to agree on a simultaneous halt to the production of nuclear weapons, be they atomic, hydrogen or neutron bombs or shells. Simultaneously the USSR proposed that the nuclear powers assume an obligation to begin a gradual reduction in the already existing stockpiles, progressing until the complete "100-percent" elimination of them. This proposal was reflected in one of the resolutions approved by the 32d UN General Assembly Session.

In advancing such precise and constructive proposals, the Soviet Union was ready at any time to sit down at the conference table with all the nuclear powers in order to thoroughly review the entire scope of the problem of nuclear disarmament and in common to work out concrete paths for its practical solution. The Soviet Union had no arguments against the nonnuclear states participating as well in such talks, since all nations and all peoples of the world are interested in nuclear disarmament.

It goes without saying that nuclear disarmament could be carried out only in the instance that all the states which possess nuclear weapons would participate in it, for it would be unjust if only the nuclear powers moved toward eliminating their nuclear weapons while others stockpiled and improved them.

In 1977, there was extensive publicity for the plans which had been concealed for a rather long time to produce neutron nuclear weapons in the United States and deploy them in the European NATO countries. Neutron weapons are the most monstrous type of weapons in the entire history of mankind. The adopting of them by states would strengthen the threat of a torcherous death for millions of people and their deployment on the territory of densely populated Western Europe would make the unleashing of a nuclear war more probable.

The Soviet Union was decisively against the development of the neutron bomb and warned that if the bomb was developed in the West, the USSR would not remain a passive observer and would be confronted with the necessity of making a reply to this challenge for the purposes of ensuring the security of the Soviet people, their allies and friends.

The Soviet state did not limit itself to condemning the plans to produce the neutron bomb or issuing warnings over the dangerous plans of the West. The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, on 24 December 1977, officially put forward a clear and concrete proposal to agree on the mutual abandoning of neutron weapons production.

On 9 March 1978, the Warsaw Pact states made a new initiative: they submitted for review to the Disarmament Committee in Geneva a draft convention on banning neutron weapons. This draft envisaged that the signatories to the convention "would pledge not to produce, not to stockpile, not to deploy anywhere and not to employ nuclear neutron weapons."

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The draft stipulated that control over the observance of the convention should be carried out by the signatory states by employing the national technical devices at their disposal in such a manner as to conform to the generally recognized standards of international law.

Although a discussion of the draft convention in essence had not even commenced, certain representatives in the West, and in particular in the United States, hurried to express a negative attitude to the very idea of the proposed convention.

The plans to arm NATO with the neutron bomb evoked indignation throughout the world. The movement against the neutron bomb assumed unprecedented scope. It included tens of millions of people and the most diverse social organizations. The small NATO countries stated their refusal to deploy neutron weapons on their territory.

The actions of the world community and the protests in the United States itself led to a situation where President J. Carter announced on 7 April 1978 his decision to "defer production" of neutron weapons.

Considering the decision of President J. Carter, L. I. Brezhnev stated on 25 April 1978 that the Soviet Union "also would not begin production of neutron weapons, if the United States did not do this. The future would depend on Washington."²⁰

As events were to show, the United States continued to pressure the USSR in the hope of achieving concessions which would be detrimental to the security of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries. On 25 October 1978, J. Carter signed a draft law on providing allocations to produce the basic components of the neutron bomb. Hence the question of the possibility of deploying this barbarian type of weapon in Western Europe has in no way been removed from the agenda.

The 23d UN General Assembly Session (1978) supported the proposal of the Soviet Union and called on all states possessing nuclear weapons to begin consultations on the rapid commencement of talks on halting the nuclear arms race.

At the beginning of February 1979, the USSR, together with the other socialist countries, submitted to the Disarmament Committee a document containing specific proposals entitled "On Talks to Halt Nuclear Weapons Production in All Forms and Gradually Reduce Their Stockpiles Until Complete Elimination." The essence of these proposals came down to the following.

The corresponding talks should be conducted with the participation of all states possessing nuclear weapons as well as a certain number of states which did not possess nuclear weapons.

The subject of the talks was to be the halting of nuclear weapons production in all their forms and a gradual reduction of the weapons stockpiles down to their complete elimination. In the various stages of the talks it would be possible to examine, for example: the halting of a qualitative improvement in nuclear weapons; a halt to the production of fissionable materials for military purposes; a gradual reduction in the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery systems; the elimination of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Here the necessary control measures should be approved.

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The halt in production, the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons should be carried out stage-by-stage on a mutually acceptable and approved basis. The contents of measures in each stage should be a matter of agreement between the participants in the talks. The degree of participation in carrying out each stage by the individual nuclear powers should be determined considering the quantitative and qualitative importance of the existing arsenals of the states possessing nuclear weapons and the other corresponding states. In all the stages, the existing balance in the area of nuclear power should be left undisturbed with a gradual reduction in its level.

The proposal by the socialist countries evoked great interest. All the member states of the committee participated in the discussion. A special statement by the group of nonaligned and neutral states expressed satisfaction with the initiative of the socialist countries. The nonaligned states were in favor of agreement being reached in the course of the 1979 committee session on the "preliminary conditions and elements of multilateral talks on nuclear disarmament and the sequence of actions was generally outlined for the purpose of obtaining the designated goal."

Extensive approval was given to the principles proposed by the socialist nations and on which the talks should be based. These were: nondetrimentalness to the security of the parties, the participation of all five nuclear powers, the parallel strengthening of political and international legal guarantees for the security of states, the continuing of other talks on the problems of nuclear disarmament and so forth.

The United States and the countries allied with it in essence were against halting the nuclear arms race under the pretext that talks on this problem at the given stage were supposedly "premature," although a majority of the committee members were in favor of continuing and intensifying the exchange of opinions on the given question. Due to the resistance from the Western states, the committee was unable to carry out the required preparatory work and make a beginning to the talks in 1979. An agreement was reached that an examination of the question of halting the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament would be continued at the following committee session. Support for the commencing of talks on disarmament in the nuclear area involving all the nuclear powers was voiced also by the 34th UN General Assembly Session which approved, under a Soviet proposal, a special resolution on this question.

A ban on all nuclear weapons testing has been a long urgent question the solution to which would largely determine a halt in the arms race. The USSR and the Warsaw Pact feel that this problem must be solved without waiting for the outcome of the talks on full nuclear disarmament. The reason for this is that a ban on all nuclear weapons testing would put an end to their qualitative improvement and would stop the appearance of new types of these weapons. After the first important step of the concluding in 1963 of the Moscow Treaty on Banning Nuclear Weapons Testing in the Atmosphere, in Space and Underwater, the next achievement in this area was the signing in 1974 of the Treaty on Limiting Underground Nuclear Weapons Testing by the USSR and the United States. The treaty, starting on 31 March 1976, prohibited any underground explosions of nuclear weapons with a power of over 150 kilotons and restricted the number of explosions below this level.

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But both the Moscow Treaty on the Banning of Nuclear Weapons Testing in the Atmosphere, in Space and Underwater and the 1974 Treaty between the USSR and the United States on restricting underground nuclear weapons testing only partially solved this problem. Moreover, two out of the five nuclear powers did not sign the Moscow Treaty and one of them, China, continues even now to carry out test nuclear explosions in the atmosphere.

After the Helsinki Conference, the Soviet Union became even more active in working for a full halt on nuclear weapons testing.

At the 30th UN General Assembly Session in 1975, the Soviet delegation, as an important and timely step, proposed a discussion of the question of concluding a treaty on the full and universal banning of nuclear weapons testing. A draft of such a treaty was then submitted by the Soviet Union to the United Nations and the General Assembly was in favor of holding specific talks with the aim of reaching an agreement on the full and universal banning of nuclear weapons testing. Due to the negative position of certain nuclear powers, however, these talks were not commenced. As is known, for a long time the question of halting underground nuclear tests has been complicated by certain states through the artificial exaggeration of the control question. It was steadily maintained, in particular, that supposedly without an on-the-spot check it would be impossible to distinguish seismic phenomena of natural origin (earthquakes) from analogous phenomena caused by underground nuclear explosions, and consequently, it would be impossible to monitor the states' observance of their obligations in banning underground nuclear weapons tests.

A majority of specialists have never agreed with this viewpoint, feeling that national monitoring equipment is sufficient for controlling the observance of a treaty on an underground nuclear weapons test ban in addition to the international exchange of seismic data. With the development of equipment for detecting seismic phenomena, this viewpoint now has virtually universal support by all scientists. However, at present certain states are in favor of a provision for the possibility of investigating actual circumstances on the spot, if doubts arise on the observance of obligations to halt underground nuclear tests.

In showing good will and endeavoring to move things off dead center, the Soviet Union at the 31st UN General Assembly Session in 1976 stated its agreement to participate in working out such a compromise basis for an agreement, where voluntary limits would be observed in taking a decision to investigate the pertinent circumstances on the spot and at the same time all the signatories of the treaty would be certain that the obligations were being carried out.

The Soviet Union made a great effort to conclude a new Soviet-American treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in 1976. The treaty established a procedure for conducting these explosions whereby there would be no possibility of using them for the purposes of improving nuclear weapons. This was a weighty contribution by the USSR to the cause of a complete ban on all nuclear weapons tests.

In November 1977, the Soviet Union took a new important step in agreeing that in parallel with a ban, at a certain time, on all nuclear weapons testing a moratorium

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was to be declared on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The purpose of this proposal was to facilitate the reaching of agreement on a full and universal banning of nuclear weapons testing since the Western partners had asserted that supposedly it would be difficult to determine the nature of the explosion.

In the aim of achieving agreement on a complete and universal ban on nuclear weapons testing, the Soviet Union agreed to the conducting of an inspection on a voluntary basis and that a treaty on the full and universal banning of nuclear weapons testing would come into force even in the instance that not all five nuclear powers would initially join it, but only three, the USSR, the United States and Great Britain. Moreover, the Soviet Union made a gesture to its partners in proposing a 3-year period of action for the agreement. The Western powers proposed a 5-year term, and then the United States revised its position and announced that in any event the agreement should not be in effect for more than 3 years. The duplicity of the American position could also be felt in the fact that, on the one hand, it was aimed at a complete ban on testing, and on the other, envisaged a continuation of "low-power nuclear explosive experiments."

The USSR steadily continued to work for a rapid conclusion to the elaboration and signing of a treaty on the full and universal banning of nuclear weapons testing. At the 34th UN General Assembly Session, the USSR delegation voted in favor of a resolution supporting such a treaty.

The problem of strengthening the conditions for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is most directly linked to the question of banning all nuclear weapons testing. 5 March 1980 marked the 10th anniversary of the coming into force of the nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty. The pledge to abandon the proliferation of nuclear weapons had become a standard of international law.

The Warsaw Pact countries made a serious contribution to the elaboration of the designated treaty and are its active participants. They proceed from the view that the appearance of new nuclear states would lead to an outburst of the arms race and would cause a corresponding response in other countries. Under such conditions the question of eliminating nuclear weapons would be greatly complicated. For this reason it was important to see to it that the nonproliferation treaty became truly universal.

In recent years, the sphere of action of the nonproliferation treaty has broadened. In particular, it has been signed by nations which possess a highly developed atomic industry such as the FRG, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Japan. Presently more than 100 states have signed it.

However, up to now a number of states remain outside the treaty, including those which could be termed quasinuclear. Among them are South Africa and Israel which are conducting an expansionist policy. Undoubtedly, the treaty could have played an even greater role if it had been signed by all states possessing an atomic industry or planning to create it in the near future.

In this regard one cannot help but be alarmed by certain of the international deals concluded in recent years in the nuclear area. Thus, the FRG has sold nuclear equipment and technology totaling 10 billion marks to Brazil which has not

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signed the nonproliferation treaty. The United States has proposed the sale of two nuclear reactors by General Electric to the racist regime of South Africa.

Such actions are detrimental to the international community's efforts aimed at restricting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The problem is that in the process of operating nuclear power plants, as is known, a fissionable substance, plutonium, is formed as a side product and is accumulated. This substance can be used for creating a nuclear weapon.

Facts show that the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a real one. In September 1977, the South African Minister of Finances O. Horwood stated at a congress of the ruling National Party that his country "maintains the right to employ its own nuclear potential for military purposes."

The Soviet Union in a TASS Announcement of 9 August 1977 condemned the plans for the development of nuclear weapons in South Africa and drew the attention of the world community to the fact that their realization would have the most serious, far-reaching consequences for international peace and security.

Further events fully affirmed the validity of the concern and anxiety voiced by the Soviet Union over the South African nuclear weapons plans. According to announcements of foreign agencies, on 22 September 1979 a low-yield nuclear explosion conducted by racist South Africa was recorded in the South Atlantic. This explosion caused a stormy response by the dependent African countries and many other states of the world.

It is perfectly obvious that for the South African racists, the atomic bomb represents a means of blackmail and intimidation against the independent African states and a means for strengthening the apartheid system at home. Unfortunately, judging from everything, South Africa is capable of producing nuclear weapons. American and West German companies have designed, delivered equipment and built an experimental nuclear reactor in Pelindab. A French consortium in 1976 concluded a contract to build a nuclear power plant in the region of Cape Town. South Africa is cooperating in the nuclear area with Israel which has helped Pretoria acquire technical information on the production of nuclear weapons in exchange for South African uranium.

Other countries are also working to achieve nuclear weapons. Hence a further strengthening of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons has assumed particular significance. Under the conditions of the exacerbation of the international situation it is all the more essential to work out new measures to develop international cooperation in this area and to create conditions which would provide an opportunity for all nations to obtain good from the peaceful use of atomic energy.

Closely tied to the problem of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is the question of the security of nonnuclear states and the preventing of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of states where they are not presently found. In 1978, at the 33d UN General Assembly Session, the USSR proposed that an international convention be concluded on strengthening the guarantees for the security of nonnuclear states and submitted a draft of such a convention.

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The implementation of this new Soviet initiative would lead to a strengthening of the security of a predominant majority of states which do not possess nuclear capacity. The measure proposed by the USSR is effective, and its significance would remain until the realization of full nuclear disarmament. This measure could also assist in strengthening the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons by weakening the incentive throughout the world to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

The Soviet proposal caused a broad positive response in the General Assembly, and was approved by a predominant majority of the delegations. The Soviet Union, on its behalf, affirmed that it would never employ nuclear weapons against those states which refuse to produce and acquire such weapons and did not have them on their territory.

In 1979, in developing this Soviet initiative, a group of socialist states including the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Mongolia, Poland and Czechoslovakia, submitted to the disarmament committee, a draft international convention on strengthening the guarantees for the security of nonnuclear states. The idea of concluding a multi-lateral international agreement on this question was greeted with fervent support among a broad group of states on the committee, and primarily the nonaligned.

The socialist countries proposed that the guarantees be given both to nonnuclear countries which do not participate in military-political alliances as well as to countries which, although tied by allied obligations to nuclear states, do not possess and do not produce nuclear weapons and do not have them on their territory.

In the course of the discussion, it was pointed out that the formula contained in the draft of the socialist countries considered the interests of a broad range of states. In the first place, it encompassed the maximum possible number of states which could, considering the real situation in the world, be given a guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons; secondly, it encouraged the states to refuse to possess nuclear weapons, to deploy them on their territory and thereby helped to narrow the possible sphere of use of nuclear weapons, to strengthen nonproliferation and, consequently, reduced the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war.

For holding specific talks and working out a corresponding international convention, the committee set up a special work group which was given all the documents and proposals submitted to the committee. However, the achieving of agreement on this question was in essence blocked by the delegations of the United States and the other Western powers who were against the concluding of an international convention on strengthening guarantees for the security of nonnuclear states. The committee will continue talks on this question in 1980.

At the 34th UN General Assembly Session in 1979, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries proposed that the UN member states study the possibility of concluding an international agreement on the nondeployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of states where they do not presently exist.

The USSR has been a decisive supporter of strict guarantees that international co-operation in the area of the peaceful use of nuclear energy does not become a channel for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is not a commercial question, rather it is a question of policy, a question of international security. At the

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31st UN General Assembly Session, the Soviet Union, together with the other Warsaw Pact members, acted decisively in favor of improving the control system for nuclear units and materials which was being carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It stated its readiness to cooperate with all interested states in these areas.

The USSR has been a consistent supporter of creating nuclear-free zones in Europe and other regions of the world. It views their creation as one of the measures for strengthening the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, for reducing the threat of nuclear war and for regional military detente. It is essential that such zones be actually free of nuclear weapons and the corresponding agreements must not contain escape clauses for violating the nuclear-free status of the zones.

In accord with its principled line of reducing the threat of nuclear war, on 25 April 1978 the Soviet Union approved a decision in the appropriate form to adhere to the international treaty on the banning of nuclear weapons in Latin America (the Tlatelolco Treaty). In this manner, the Soviet Union, like the other powers which possess nuclear weapons, assumed an obligation not to help the Latin American countries acquire nuclear weapons as well as not to employ such weapons against the signatory states. Thus the USSR has helped to strengthen the first and as yet only nuclear-free zone in the world, a zone encompassing a majority of the Latin American states.

The Warsaw Pact countries, in being decisive supporters of prohibiting the creation of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction, view this problem as one of the most acute and immediate problems of world policy. As was stated in the Bucharest (1976) Declaration of the PCC, they consider international agreement on this question essential. The rapid development of the scientific and technical revolution has posed a dilemma for mankind: either the scientific discoveries will serve the good of peoples or they will be put to serving the arms race.

As is known, military equipment in an unprecedentedly short time has traveled a distance from atomic to thermonuclear weapons, from strategic bombers to ICBM, from missiles located on the earth's surface to missiles in silos and on submarines, from single-charge missiles to missiles with multiple atomic warheads.

Since at present there are no restrictions on the use of science for military purposes, at any time the most unexpected changes of events can occur and their consequences cannot be predicted. It is impossible to exclude the appearance of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction with unprecedented destructive power. It is quite realistic to assume that there is the real danger of the development in the foreseeable future of weapons which can be commensurate in terms of destructive effect with the nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons or even surpass them.

As has been stated in the Western press, the military-industrial complex of the United States and the other NATO countries is working on the development of weapons that are truly monstrous in their effect. It is technically feasible to create the so-called gigaton nuclear bombs with a power of 1,000 and more megatons. One can imagine the destruction and human losses caused by such bombs in realizing that the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 50,000 times less powerful.

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The Western press has also announced work on the development of so-called psychotropic weapons by which it is possible to influence the human psyche and stimulate a loss of memory, a disruption of correct perception and other mental disturbances leading to the demoralization of people. Announcements have also appeared on ray weapons using ionizing radiation of special devices or radioactive substances for acting on the human organism (on the blood and intracellular plasma) for the purpose of both the rapid and gradual exposure of it to radiation sickness. The work being done in the area of molecular biology is capable of leading to the development of bacilli which are immune to any modern medicines and vaccines. They also can be used for military purposes.

In speaking on 14 October 1975 at a dinner in honor of the President of France Valerie Giscard d'Estaing, L. I. Brezhnev pointed out: "Ever-greater urgency, we are convinced, attends the attainment of a broad international agreement which envisages the strict obligation of states not to develop new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons."²¹

At the 30th UN General Assembly Session, the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko, on behalf of the Soviet government, made a proposal to include on the agenda of the session as urgent and timely the question of prohibiting the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. The essence of the Soviet proposal consisted in having all states, primarily the large states, conclude an agreement based on a pledge not to develop and not to produce new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction, not to aid and not to encourage any activities aimed at this.

The 30th UN General Assembly Session adopted a resolution "On Banning the Development and Production of New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons." Voting in favor of it were 112 nations, that is, a predominant majority.

In accord with this resolution, in Geneva, in the Disarmament Committee, talks were started on the given question. Since in the course of the talks, a desire was voiced to concretize the subject of the ban, that is, to define the new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction, the Soviet Union proposed that new types of weapons of mass destruction include any types of weapons based upon qualitatively new principles of action in terms of the method of use or the objects of destruction or the nature of the effect.

At the 32d UN General Assembly Session, the nations of the socialist commonwealth again urged the Disarmament Committee to work out an agreement prohibiting the use of scientific and technical achievements for creating and producing new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

The 33d UN General Assembly Session approved a resolution urging the Disarmament Committee to actively continue talks for the purpose of working out the text of an agreement to ban the development of new types and systems of such weapons.

The Soviet proposals on this question have been a subject of bilateral Soviet-American talks in the Disarmament Committee. The greatest headway has occurred over one of the new types of weapons, radiological. The Soviet and U.S. delegations,

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in accord with the agreement reached at the Vienna summit meeting, on 10 July 1979 submitted a joint proposal on the basic elements of a treaty for banning the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. The draft treaty on the banning of radiological weapons was a result of 2-year (from May 1977 through July 1979) Soviet-American talks. This document distributed in the committee in parallel by the USSR and U.S. delegations was aimed at preventing the appearance of one of the types of weapons of mass destruction, radiological weapons, which in the event of their development and use would cause mass human casualties and have extremely dangerous consequences for mankind.

The Soviet Union views a ban on radiological weapons as a partial solution to the problem of an all-encompassing ban on new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The treaty on banning radiological weapons, thus, can become still another important contribution to limiting the arms race and saving mankind from this danger. In this manner a major step will be taken which will prevent the use of scientific and technical progress for the purposes of developing new types of weapons of mass destruction.

In approving the idea of concluding a treaty on banning radiological weapons, a number of delegations, in referring to the newness and complexity of the problem and the necessity of carefully studying it, were in favor of extending a review of the submitted Soviet-American proposals and the talks on them to the following session of the Disarmament Committee. This viewpoint was supported by the other committee members and the talks will be continued.

In December 1979, upon Soviet initiative, the 34th UN General Assembly Session adopted a resolution calling for the conclusion of an all-encompassing agreement on banning new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The assembly pointed to the importance of preventing a qualitative arms race so that the achievements of scientific and technical progress could be employed only for peaceful purposes.

In the opinion of the Warsaw Pact, the task of completely banning and eliminating a dangerous category of weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, has assumed particular urgency in the struggle for military detente. As is known, the use of these weapons even during the years of World War I caused heavy suffering and the mass death of people. Since then military chemical technology has moved far ahead, and new types of chemical weapons have been developed capable of causing even more torturous death for people. In December 1979, the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a statement which, in particular, said: "The entire world knows that during its aggressive war against the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, the United States widely used chemical toxins which led to the death and poisoning of a large number of peaceful inhabitants and caused enormous destruction to the environment that is still felt. The facts of these barbarian crimes have been repeatedly confirmed by many prominent scientists and public figures from different nations."

The socialist countries are waging a consistent struggle to outlaw chemical weapons. Even in 1972, the USSR and the other socialist countries of the Warsaw Pact submitted to the Disarmament Committee a draft convention on the question of the complete and universal banning of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons as well as the destruction of their stocks. The Warsaw Pact

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members have done everything in their power to make an international agreement on banning and destroying chemical weapons a reality. This is also the purpose of the Bucharest Declaration (1976) of the PCC which directly states that the Warsaw Pact members "consider essential an international agreement on the banning and destruction of chemical weapons."

Unfortunately, representatives of the NATO countries, without acting in principle against a ban on chemical weapons, have endeavored to draw the question into a quagmire of drawn-out and futile discussions over the technical aspects of the problem. It is apparent that there are not and cannot be any reasons for a delay on the question of banning chemical weapons. Here it is merely a question of showing political will and a desire to achieve a reasonable, generally acceptable agreement.

The Soviet Union has set a good example on this question. The Soviet delegation proposed that the 31st UN General Assembly Session start by discussing the question of the ban and elimination of the most dangerous, fatal types of chemical weapons. Here a substantial contribution could have been made by realizing the Soviet-American agreement on a joint initiative to conclude a convention on the most dangerous, fatal chemical weapons.

As for control over the observance of the ban on chemical weapons, it should be based upon national procedures. In this regard there is the positive precedent of the Convention on Banning Bacteriological Weapons. At the same time, the Soviet Union expressed a readiness to examine the possibility of using additional control procedures, and in particular, to discuss a method for monitoring the destruction of the stocks of chemical weapons which were to be excluded from the arsenals of the states.

The resolution sponsored by Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union and adopted by the 31st UN General Assembly Session drew attention to the risk related to the further development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons under conditions when there was no international agreement which would not only fully ban but also provide for the destruction of such weapons. The resolution pointed out that the achieving of the corresponding agreement would contribute to the cause of complete and universal disarmament under effective international control.

Upon the proposal of a number of the socialist and other countries, the 32d Session urgently called on all states to make an effort to quickly reach agreement on an effective ban on the development, production and stockpiling of all types of chemical weapons and their destruction and requested that the Disarmament Committee in Geneva be first concerned with working out an appropriate agreement considering all the existing proposals and future initiatives submitted for its review.

In the course of the Vienna meeting in June 1979 between the Soviet and U.S. leaders, both sides affirmed the importance of an universal, complete and supervisable ban on chemical weapons and agreed to increase their efforts to prepare a coordinated joint proposal for submission to the Disarmament Committee. Soon after the Vienna meeting, the committee was given a Soviet-American statement on the course of the bilateral talks from which it could be seen that definite, and in a number

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of instances, significant progress had been made in the talks. At the same time, slow progress was being made on certain important points.

A majority of the committee members expressed satisfaction with the bilateral announcement and participated in the discussion. The line of the more active involvement of the committee in the work on the basic proposals of the future convention was fully and completely supported by the Soviet delegation which recalled that the Soviet state virtually from the first days of its existence had demanded a ban on chemical weapons. In particular, it was stated that the Soviet Union fully share the opinion of the broadest group of states on the urgent need for an immediate ban on chemical weapons as well as their concern over the absence of an international agreement on this matter.

The Disarmament Committee, proceeding from the view that a ban on chemical weapons was one of the most immediate and vitally important problems in the disarmament area, decided to continue talks on this question in 1980 as well.

The USSR was among those UN member states which at the 34th UN General Assembly Session urged an immediate conclusion to an international convention on banning nuclear weapons.

In the opinion of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact members, a limitation on the so-called conventional types of weapons could also serve well the cause of military detente. Their diversity and power and their lethal strength had risen manifold in comparison with the period of World War II. As was shown by the example of Vietnam, bombing raids with modern so-called conventional bombs have such consequences that for measuring their destructive force it would be possible almost to employ those criteria for assessing the destructive might of nuclear weapons.

In the postwar years all acts of aggression have been carried out exclusively with the use of conventional weapons. And at present the peoples fighting against colonial suppression are the victims of the use of precisely conventional weapons. Israeli aggression against the Arab states and peoples was also carried out, as is known, using conventional weapons.

"Certainly it is a fact," said A. A. Gromyko, "that 80 percent of the world expenditures on military needs go for conventional arms. How many people in the postwar period alone have become victims of the use of weapons which are termed conventional but which now possess--due to the amazing accuracy as well as the complete destruction of large areas--the most lethal power!"²²

For this reason the task of approving real measures to reduce aviation, artillery, tanks and other modern types of conventional arms, and likewise the armed forces equipped with them, has in no way lost its urgency. The Warsaw Pact members were proceeding from this when they pointed out in the Bucharest Declaration (1976) that they "gave great significance to concluding agreements on reducing armed forces and conventional arms."²³ The socialist countries, as is known, have repeatedly made specific proposals on this question.

The Soviet Union is sincerely ready to conduct talks on reducing armed forces and armaments. It has repeatedly stated this on various levels. The readiness for

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talks on this question was mentioned, in particular, in the memorandum of the Soviet Union on the questions of halting the arms race and disarmament submitted to the UN General Assembly in September 1976.²⁴

On 25 April 1978, L. I. Brezhnev came forward with a proposal to give up the enlarging of armies and increasing the conventional weapons of the states which were permanent members of the Security Council and the countries linked to them by military agreements.

If there were a desire by all states possessing large armed forces to conduct talks on the conventional types of weapons, then positive results and constructive accords could be reached.

The Soviet Union, in acting in the spirit of the Final Act, together with its allies has worked actively to eliminate all foreign military bases on foreign territories and for the withdrawal of foreign troops from them. The urgency of this problem has been emphasized by the fact that by the autumn of 1979, an enormous number of such bases existed throughout the world, including in Western Europe. The U.S. President J. Carter stated: "We have created too many military bases overseas." According to official data alone, the Pentagon had approximately 2,500 various military installations located in more than 30 nations of the world, including in nations which signed the Final Act.²⁵

In Western Europe the American military bases in 1979 were manned by 340,000 American soldiers and officers, including around 240,000 in the FRG, more than 20,000 in England, more than 12,000 in Italy, 4,800 in Turkey and 3,700 in Greece. The U.S. President stated that the Pentagon was maintaining its troops on the territories of other countries as well and "some of them are very close to the frontiers of the Soviet Union."

The Warsaw Pact has acted decidedly to solve this question both on a global scale and in terms of the individual continents. But there has been no progress here, and this cannot help but cause concern. The Soviet Union, together with the other Warsaw Pact nations, is ready to collaborate actively and constructively in settling the given question. In November 1976, great attention was given to it again at a meeting of the Warsaw Pact PCC in Bucharest.

Two years later, in November 1978, the Warsaw Pact nations, in the Moscow Declaration of the PCC, reaffirmed their consistent position in favor of eliminating military bases on foreign territories and pulling foreign troops out of the territories of other states, including European ones.

The ensuring of security in the Mediterranean would be a major contribution to deepening the process of military detente in Europe as well as beyond it as this region encompasses more than 20 nations of Europe, Africa and Asia. The Soviet Union is a supporter of moving on to constructive talks and practical steps in a direction of extending military detente into the Mediterranean.

"We want," said L. I. Brezhnev, "the Mediterranean Sea to become a sea of peace, good neighbors and cooperation."²⁶ The Soviet Union and the other socialist nations are ready to increase their contribution to the practical embodiment of this noble task which meets the interests of all the Mediterranean peoples.

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At the Bucharest Session of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee in May 1979, the USSR and the other socialist countries stated their readiness to extend all measures which would strengthen detente and confidence in Europe as well to the Mediterranean. The Soviet proposal remained in effect to withdraw from the Mediterranean the Soviet and American ships capable of carrying nuclear weapons; this had been proposed by L. I. Brezhnev in July 1974.

The vital importance of the proposals of the USSR and its allies vis-a-vis the Mediterranean is obvious. It has been proposed that new types of nuclear missile weapons--Pershing-2 missiles and cruise missiles--be deployed in one of the nations of this region, Italy. And this in addition to the American forward based weapons which already exist there! Understandably, such actions could only be detrimental to the security of the Mediterranean and to all the nations of Western Europe which signed the Final Act. To prevent such a development of events is the aim of the proposals of the Soviet Union and the other nations of the socialist commonwealth.

In the opinion of the Soviet Union and all the Warsaw Pact members, an effective measure in the area of military detente would be a reduction in the military budgets of the states which possess a great military and economic potential. The resources released in this instance could be channeled into the economic and social progress of peoples, at raising the economic growth rate, providing employment, developing new sources of energy, solving the food problem, combating diseases and building new schools and institutions of higher learning.

A reduction of a military budget is a most visible indicator of in what direction one or another nation intends to work on the world scene, that is, toward war or toward peace. The share of military expenditures in the budget of the Soviet Union itself in recent years has systematically declined. In 1976, expenditures were 17.4 billion rubles, or 7.8 percent of all the expenditures of the budget, in 1977, 17.2 billion, or 7.2 percent, in 1978, 17.2 billion, or 7 percent, and in 1979, 17.2 billion rubles were allocated for these purposes, or 6.8 percent.²⁷

The Warsaw Pact countries, starting in 1973, have repeatedly made proposals to reduce military budgets and by their actions have set an example in this regard.

At the 31st UN General Assembly Session the Soviet Union reaffirmed its proposal to reduce military budgets and, in endeavoring to put this important matter on a practical basis, stated that it was ready to assume a flexible position on the issue of the specific figure from which the reduction in military budgets should start. It would be possible to agree both on a larger figure than 10 percent or on a smaller one as the first step. However, it was important to make this question more rapidly a matter of business-like talks between the concerned states. At the Bucharest Conference of the PCC in November 1976, the Warsaw Pact affirmed its support for the idea of reducing the military budgets of states.

The socialist countries are convinced that it is possible and necessary to replace the current constant rise in the military expenditures of many states by their systematic reduction. The Soviet Union favors having the nations which possess a great economic and military potential, including the permanent members of the Security Council, agree on specific amounts for reducing their military budgets either in a percentage or in absolute terms. It insisted that such a reduction

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Start in 1979 and cover a 3-year period. Some 10 percent of the funds freed from the reduction could be spent on increasing aid to the developing nations. It is not the fault of the Soviet Union that this vitally important question continues to remain unsolved.

A number of useful initiatives in the area of disarmament were proposed by the socialist nations which signed the Helsinki Accords in the course of the 34th UN General Assembly Session, having demonstrated their leading role in the struggle to halt the arms race. The General Assembly approved the declaration proposed by the Czechoslovak delegation on international cooperation for the purposes of disarmament. This declaration represents an unique code of standards for conducting disarmament talks. The GDR played an active role in the drafting and adopting of a resolution on increasing efforts aimed at disarmament and checking the arms race.

FOOTNOTES

1. See PRAVDA, 2 August 1975.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. See PRAVDA, 22 October 1977.
5. See PRAVDA, 24 November 1978.
6. See PRAVDA, 7 October 1979.
7. PRAVDA, 2 August 1975.
8. "Materialy XXV S"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 24.
9. See PRAVDA, 23 July 1976.
10. See MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, No 11, 1977, p 113.
11. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim Kursom," Vol 7, Moscow, 1979, pp 297-298.
12. See PRAVDA, 29 June 1979.
13. L. I. Brezhnev, op. cit., Vol 5, pp 337-338.
14. Ibid., Vol 6, p 292.
15. "Materialy XXV S"yezda KPSS," p 38.
16. L. I. Brezhnev, op. cit., Vol 7, p 266.
17. "Radi Mira na Zemle: Sovetsko-Amerikanskaya Vstrecha na Vysshem Urovne v Vene, 15-18 Iyunya 1979 Goda. Dokumenty, Rechi, Materialy" [For the Sake of Peace in the World: The Soviet-American Summit Meeting in Vienna, 15-18 June 1979. Documents, Speeches, Materials], Moscow, 1979, p 32.

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18. Ibid., pp 68-69.
19. PRAVDA, 26 June 1979.
20. L. I. Brezhnev, op. cit., Vol 7, p 296.
21. Ibid., Vol 5, p 377.
22. A. A. Gromyko, "Vo Imya Torzhestva Leninskoy Vneshney Politiki. Izbrannyye Rechi i Stat'i" [In the Name of the Triumph of Leninist Foreign Policy. Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1977, p 540.
23. "Soveshchaniye Politicheskogo Konsul'tativnogo Komiteta Gosudarstv--Uchastnikov Varshavskogo Dogovora. Bukharest, 25-26 Noyabrya 1976 Goda" [Meeting of the Warsaw Pact PCC. Bucharest, 25-26 November 1976], p 14.
24. See PRAVDA, 30 September 1976.
25. See KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 30 September 1979.
26. L. I. Brezhnev, op. cit., Vol 7, p 448.
27. See MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', No 2, 1979, p 102.

[Conclusion; pp 217-219]

In May 1980, international life celebrated a major event, the meeting of the Warsaw Pact PCC. The conference was a new affirmation of the profound adherence and firm determination of the fraternal countries to continue the struggle to strengthen security and to develop cooperation in Europe, for universal peace, liberty and independence of peoples, for international detente, for halting the arms race and for disarmament.

The conference unanimously approved documents of enormous political significance. These were the Declaration and Statement which give a complete program for detente, and they indicate the ways and means for strengthening European and world peace. The socialist countries reaffirmed their readiness for a constructive dialogue with all the interested states. They advanced an exceptionally important proposal to agree that, beginning at a definite, approved date, no state or no grouping of states in Europe would increase the size of their armed forces in the region defined by the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The Warsaw Pact members favored careful and intensive preparations for the Madrid Meeting set for the end of 1980 and for conducting it in a constructive and business-like spirit. The Declaration firmly and clearly stated that the conclusion of the Madrid Meeting by positive and concrete results would have a beneficial effect on the overall state of the international atmosphere.

The Warsaw Pact countries favored accelerated preparations for a conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe and the holding of multilateral

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preliminary consultations by the representatives of the states which would participate in the proposed conference. They were in favor of the Madrid Meeting approving practical decisions on the tasks of the conference, on the dates, place and procedure of its holding and on the agenda for its stage having concentrated the conference's work on confidence-building measures. As for the place of holding the conference, the conference participants supported the proposal to convene it in the capital of Poland, Warsaw.

They also pointed to the necessity of increasing efforts for the purpose of rapidly achieving agreement on various areas of limiting and halting the arms race.

The immediate tasks in this area, along with ratification of the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-2), were the rapid bringing to a successful conclusion of the talks on:

- 1) Complete and universal banning of nuclear weapons testing;
- 2) Banning radiological weapons;
- 3) Banning chemical weapons and destroying their stocks;
- 4) The nonuse of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states who do not have them on their territory and the nondeployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of states where they do not presently exist.

The reaching of agreement on each of these measures, the Declaration emphasizes, would help to improve the international situation and the successful conclusion of the talks would be a major achievement for the good of mankind.

The socialist countries proposed an immediate start to business-like talks on the following urgent measures in the area of halting the arms race and reducing the threat of war:

- 1) The concluding of a world treaty on the renunciation of force;
- 2) The halting of nuclear weapons production and a gradual reduction in their stockpiles until their complete elimination;
- 3) Banning the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction;
- 4) Reducing military budgets, primarily of the large states;
- 5) Restricting and reducing the level of military presence and military activities in the corresponding regions, be it the Atlantic, Indian or Pacific oceans, the Mediterranean Sea or Persian Gulf.

At the meeting in Warsaw, in addition, a separate Statement was approved. The higher leadership of the countries represented at the conference proposed that in the immediate future a summit meeting be held for the leaders of states from all regions of the world. Such a meeting could focus attention on the key questions of

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international life and outline the ways for eliminating centers of international tension.

The documents of the Warsaw meeting were permeated with a profound belief that even the most confused and complicated problems, global or regional, could be settled by political means. This applies also to the problems of a Near East settlement and to the American-Iranian conflict.

In speaking after the signing of the conference documents, L. I. Brezhnev said: "In the present complex situation, when millions of people fear for the fate of detente and peace, from Warsaw there rings a clear warning against a policy of military adventures and feverish arms race; there rings a voice of reason and peace and an affirmation of will to cooperate in solving acute problems of the modern world."¹

FOOTNOTE

1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim Kursom," Vol 5, p 339.

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ARMED FORCES

IDEOLOGICAL COLLECTION OFFERS SUGGESTIONS TO MILITARY POLITICAL WORKERS

Moscow IDEYNAYA ZAKALKA VOYENNYKH KADROV in Russian 1979 (signed to press 26 Jun 79)
pp 2, 63-93, 107-116, 128

[Annotation, table of contents, and selected articles from book "Ideological Conditioning of Military Personnel", Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, Voenizdat, 100,000 copies, 128 pages]

[Text] This collection of articles discusses the problems and experience of commanders, political organs, and party organizations involved in the ideological and theoretical conditioning of officers in light of decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and decrees subsequently adopted by the party Central Committee.

This book is intended for commanders, political workers, and elected party officials.

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"The Study of Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice", by Major General M. I. Yasyukov, Chief, Department of Marxism-Leninism, Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov

The attention devoted by commanders and political personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy to the methodology of military theory and practice has risen noticeably in recent years. There are a number of reasons for this.

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First, the missions facing army and navy personnel today have grown more complex. Together with fraternal armies of countries in the socialist fraternity, the Soviet Armed Forces are dependably protecting the revolutionary achievements and peaceful labor of their peoples against the aggressive transgressions of imperialism, and they are serving as the bulwark of peace in all the world. Army and navy personnel spare no effort to maintain high combat readiness in the units and formations. The complex problems of military development require an integrated approach to their solution, and full consideration of the economic, political, and ideological factors of social life. One of the theoretical prerequisites for solving these problems is methodologically mature thinking by executive personnel.

Second, development of military affairs is becoming increasingly more dynamic today. The influence of the scientific-technical revolution upon the army and navy is growing. The resources of warfare are being updated intensively, and qualitatively new forms of weapons and combat equipment are appearing with ever-greater frequency, which makes updating the methods and forms of combat unavoidable. As a result there is an increasing need for military personnel to maintain a creative approach to their work, and a convergence of their practical and scientific activities is occurring. Introduction of scientific methods into the style of their leadership is making their greater methodological sophistication necessary.

Third, today's ideological battles are becoming more acute, making it necessary, as was emphasized in the CPSU Central Committee decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination", to decisively reveal the antipopular, antihumanitarian essence of modern capitalism, and expose the hegemonist, big-power course of Beijing rulers, their aggressive aspirations, and their alignment with the forces of reaction and war. All of these tasks demand constant attention toward the philosophical and methodological aspects of the personnel's ideological-theoretical training.

Responding to this trend, back in the mid-1960's the Soviet Armed Forces began creating special study plans and programs for commanders and political leaders, foreseeing the studying of a number of methodological problems in military theory and practice.

The broad methodological problems of armed forces development and the working style of military personnel--scientific prediction, military creativity, and so on--were examined concurrently. The scope of methodological problems studied at a number of military academies and military institutes was expanded by the addition of the methodological aspects of the natural and technical sciences. Thus for many years the professors and instructors of the Military Air Engineering Academy imeni N. Ye. Zhukovskiy have been studying the subject "Marxist-Leninist Philosophy--the Methodology of the Natural, Technical, and Social Sciences, and the Theory and Practice of Military Affairs". In addition to the proceedings of the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses and traditional methodological problems, they examine special issues, for example: "The Methodological Principles of Evaluating the Combat Effectiveness of Aviation Equipment", "Social, Class, and Gnoseological Principles of the Creative Activity of the Soviet Military Scientist", and others.

Another fact of great significance was that a number of training aids, including the book "Metologicheskiye problemy voyennoy teorii i praktiki" [Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice], which has been published in two editions, were prepared in conjunction with the initiation of the study of methodological problems.

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The concept "methodological problems of theory and practice" underwent concurrent enrichment, and its scope was determined more clearly. It was emphasized that this concept pertained to that range of problems of Marxist-Leninist doctrine which have a direct, dominant influence upon the development of military science, and which affect cognition and practice in military affairs.

Consequently by the time the study plans used in the Marxist-Leninist training of officers, generals, and admirals today were developed and adopted, a certain amount of experience had already been accumulated in the study of methodological problems by executive personnel.

One new aspect was that these plans examined the methodological problems of military theory and practice in light of the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress. The congress proceedings contain a number of basic premises having great philosophical and methodological significance to the activities of military personnel. They include the social role of Marxism-Leninism, the sources of military danger today, the just nature of the struggle of peoples for social and national liberation, the need for strengthening the military-political alliance of the socialist countries, support of the popular struggle of liberation against imperialist aggression, the need for high alertness and constant combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces, and others.

Obviously, the new study plan called for studying the proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress from a certain point of view, devoting special attention to the unity of the philosophical and methodological aspects of a number of the most important provisions.

Also noteworthy is the fact that scientific conferences devoted to L. I. Brezhnev's books "Malaya zemlya" [The Little Land], "Vozrozhdeniye" [Resurrection], and "Tselina" [Virgin Soil] were held in the armed forces. These conferences had great influence in terms of improving the methodological preparedness of military executives.

Efforts to organize study groups for commanders and political workers improved significantly since then. Commanders, political organs, and party committees and organizations carefully selected the composition of groups working on the third study plan. They considered not only the position occupied by a communist but also his experience as an executive, the level of his general and military training, and his ability to independently assimilate philosophical study material.

Prominent military leaders and political workers, the chiefs of higher headquarters directorates, their deputies, and generals and admirals having considerable experience in leadership and propaganda were appointed as group leaders. Lectures were given by highly qualified specialists--professors and instructors from military institutions of higher education and scientific research institutes. Generals and officers representing the executive staff speak on a certain topic.

Party committees and persons directly responsible for organizing the lectures arrange interviews with the lecturers beforehand, orienting the latter as to the composition of the audience, its needs, and the need for tying the study material in closely with the practical tasks of the generals and officers.

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One of the main tasks facing both lecturers and seminar leaders and participants is to isolate the methodological aspect of problems under examination and demonstrate how the premises of Marxism-Leninism are to be used as the methodological tools for solving important theoretical and practical problems. Experienced executives keep this constantly in the center of their attention, explaining that assimilation of knowledge is only the first prerequisite of using it. Learning how to use this knowledge is a more complex problem.

The range of problems associated with the essence of methodology and its most important principles was examined in the lecture "The 25th CPSU Congress on the Social Role of Marxist-Leninism. Marxist-Leninist Theory--the Philosophical and Methodological Foundation of a Scientific Understanding of War" as well as in the seminar "War, Its Socioeconomic Roots, Causes, and Essence. The 25th CPSU Congress on the Sources of Military Danger".

Lecturers laid special emphasis on explaining the concept "methodology", emphasizing that any theory that is broader than the particular problems involved can serve methodological functions. But only Marxism-Leninism in general, and especially its philosophical foundation--that is, the teaching on the most general laws governing development of nature, society, and thinking--can perform the role of a universal methodology. Using the methodology of Marxism-Leninism correctly means acquiring new knowledge and solving new practical problems with reliance upon Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Clarification of these problems has made it possible to correctly approach isolation of the complex of methodological problems associated with the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war.

Practice has shown that the most correct approach to organizing seminars on this subject matter included, first of all, deep clarification of the essence of Lenin's definition of war as a continuation of state policy by the resources of armed violence. A correct understanding of the essence and content of war was, to the participants of Marxist-Leninist training groups, the dependable methodological basis for discussing a number of new problems typical of recent wars. Lenin's definition of war is precisely what makes it necessary to meticulously analyze imperialism's modern policy and the world's military-political situation.

Discussing these issues, the study group participants made broad use of the basic assessments of the international situation made by the 25th CPSU Congress, and found in the works of CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. What is very important is that the seminars thoroughly demonstrated the sources of military danger today. Seminar participants exposed the attempts of the most reactionary circles of imperialism to interrupt the thawing of the international climate, to force the arms race, and to incite new centers of military conflict in different regions of the globe. Special attention was turned to the evaluations made by the 25th CPSU Congress of the provocative policy of the Beijing leadership, which in its anti-Sovietism essentially aligns itself with the policy of the most aggressive forces of the imperialist camp.

Many groups participating in the seminar "The Social Nature, Types, and Forms of Modern Wars" made competent use of Lenin's premises to analyze local wars of the postwar era, especially in the Middle East, in Southeast Asia, and in Africa. In

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addition to clarifying the social nature of these wars, some participants touched upon the military-technical aspects, forms, and methods of combat activities. This approach to discussing the issues contained within the seminar plan made it possible to use the methodology of Marxism-Leninism to successfully assimilate the combat experience of the postwar era and to arrive at conclusions important to improving personnel training and indoctrination.

It is important that many generals and officers associated the theoretical premises with their own practical efforts at raising the combat readiness of the army and navy units and formations.

Interesting and instructive seminars were conducted on materials of the 25th CPSU Congress associated with the ideological duel in war and peace. Both the lecturers and seminar leaders provided initial orientation to the group participants in Lenin's principles of criticizing bourgeois ideology. It was namely with examination of these fundamental issues that such lessons began. Only after clarifying all of the ideological wealth of these principles did the participants go on to a criticism of concrete viewpoints of bourgeois ideologists, and their theoretical conceptions. Moreover much attention was devoted not only to the strategic directions of bourgeois propaganda but also to exposing its tactical maneuvers and day-to-day practice. In this connection the sociological, psychological, and biological conceptions of war contained in bourgeois literature were subjected to criticism, and the falseness of the fabrications of an alledged "military threat" was revealed.

The methodological problems of Soviet military development were studied in the second year. Attention was centered on problems such as the army and its place in the political system of Soviet society, its development in an environment of mature socialism, the laws governing the functions of the USSR Armed Forces, and the ways for strengthening their fighting power.

The methods employed in the lessons became more diverse. In the group led by Comrade G. P. Skorikov, for example, seminars begin as a rule with discussion of a report. After such a report is given, the material is reorganized in final form, and then used as the material in a lecture given to the personnel by the officer or general who had prepared the report. Thus a seminar on the topic "Economic, Sociopolitical, and Ideological Foundations of Soviet Military Development in the Conditions of Developed Socialism" was preceded by a report on the problem "The Party's Economic Strategy and Development of the Material Basis for Further Reinforcement of the Defense Capability of the Country and the Armed Forces". It was competently demonstrated in the course of the report that the economic achievements of the USSR are having a favorable influence, strengthening its defense capabilities. Moreover the listeners expressed interest in a special section of the report concerning economic integration of the Warsaw Pact countries, and the significance of such integration to strengthening the fighting power of the allied armies.

After the report was given, the seminar leader encouraged the group participants to discuss the key problems of the topic. In his statement, he pointed out that the participants of the discussion should make broader and fuller use of the proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress and subsequent plenums of the party Central Committee, and of the speech given at a meeting of active party members of the Ministry of Defense

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by CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member, USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, laying special emphasis on the essence and influence of the party's economic strategy upon the country's defense capabilities.

Those attending the seminar participated quite actively. They significantly supplemented the report, illuminating a number of the most important problems of the topic. The viewpoints of Engels and Lenin on the dependence of the army and navy on economic conditions were thoroughly analyzed, and the methodological significance of the works of Marxist-Leninist classicists on these issues to Soviet military development was demonstrated.

Special emphasis should be laid on the fact that the participants tried to tie the subject matter of the seminar in with their practical missions. Much attention was devoted to economic integration of countries in the socialist fraternity, and to the significance of such integration to their defense capabilities.

An interesting and instructive discussion evolved on the most important methodological premises associated with the topic. Discussing the theoretical problems, the seminar participants considered the practical activities of generals and officers.

This is precisely the typical feature of the seminar which its leader, Comrade G. P. Skorikov noted in his concluding remarks. He encouraged the report's author to rewrite it with a consideration for the statements of the seminar participants, and to publish it in the form of a pamphlet. Summarizing the statements made in the seminar, G. P. Skorikov gave a detailed description of the basic ways economic integration of the socialist countries is influencing their defensive power.

Noting the merits of this seminar, we must also venture a number of suggestions on improving its conduct. In my opinion some of the speakers did not reveal the methodological aspect of the problems under examination with sufficient clearness, as a result of which the specific applications of the seminar were lost to some extent. Certain comrades, particularly the author of the report, relied too much on the written text, making it difficult for the participants to perceive the material. What is needed is lively, creative discussion in keeping with the position and training level of the participants.

In addition to the seminar method examined above--that is, listening to and discussing a report, another proven method is that of beginning discussion of the problems contained in the seminar plan immediately after the leader's introductory remarks. An example of this is a seminar conducted by Communist P. Ya. Samokhodskiy.

The lesson was organized in such a way that many of the participants were able to take the floor several times in the course of the animated discussion, supplementing and developing the thoughts of their comrades. One such person revealed the role of science in strengthening the USSR's defense capability, offered broad generalizations on the theory associated with this issue, and revealed how methodological principles could be utilized to solve the concrete problems associated with developing the military-technical base of the Soviet Armed Forces. Another participant devoted his talk to the principal trends in the economy and their influence on the fighting power of the army and navy; he brought up much interesting material which itself became the object of a lively discussion.

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Communist P. Ya. Samokhodskiy actively led the work of the seminar, competently guiding the discussion with additional questions, brief commentaries, and substantial generalizations of each problem in the study plan. When it seemed to him that the participants were becoming distracted by purely military-technical issues, he turned their attention to one of the fundamental premises of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army--the thesis of the decisive role of man in war.

It should be noted that the participants of the group responded well to the guiding influence of the group leader. They thoroughly discussed the "man-machine" problem and examined the ways to raise the effectiveness of indoctrination in the army and navy and amplify the role of the military collective.

An extremely important contribution was made to the discussion of the seminar's subject matter by Communist Ye. A. Kovalev, who examined the problem of managing indoctrination. What was valuable about his talk was that it contained a number of practical recommendations on military-patriotic indoctrination of the young.

Such an intimate relationship between broad theoretical relationships and methodological principles on one hand and the practical issues and day-to-day activities of the participants on the other imparted a certain degree of relevancy to the seminar, eliciting great interest in the participants and predetermining the creative nature of the discussion.

It should be noted that the high ideological-theoretical and methodological level of seminars conducted in these and other groups is the result of the great organizational efforts of party committees and party organizations and the product of the substantial effort of the students to study the recommended literature.

Another factor which had a positive influence on the quality of the lessons is that some units and directorates now write up seminar plans and lists of recommended literature for the entire training year. Collective and individual consultation and exchanges of work experience are organized.

Problems associated with Marxist-Leninist training are regularly discussed at party meetings and by the party bureau. Reports by communists on their independent efforts at studying the works of Marxist-Leninist classicists and the recommended literature are now being given more frequently. In the course of discussion of such reports, communists receive additional advice on improving their personal system of independent study.

Party committees are now exercising more active control over the course of the Marxist-Leninist training afforded to the group participants. Attending the lessons, party committee members frequently engage actively in discussion of problems in the study plan, making proposals on ways to improve the seminar techniques.

Seminars are regularly held for seminar leaders in a number of places. In one of them, for example, Colonel General M. A. Garayev gave an instructive report to the generals and officers of General Headquarters directorates. Complex problems in the study plans are clarified, the methods to be used in forthcoming lessons are worked out, and positive experience is exchanged at seminars of this level.

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Party committees devoted special attention to the concluding period of the training year. The plan of the final lesson is prepared meticulously. It includes four or five of the most important problems studied during the year, and the list of literature is written up with a consideration for recently published party and government documents.

One acceptable plan for such a concluding lesson was that used in a number of methodological seminars sponsored by the central administration of the Ministry of Defense. The lesson topic was "The CPSU's Leadership--the Fundamental Principle of Soviet Military Development. Basic Laws Governing Development of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Role of Science in Strengthening the Soviet Army and Navy". The plan for the seminar included the report "The CPSU's Leadership of the Armed Forces--the Basic Law of Their Development".

Discussion of the following basic issues was recommended.

1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the basic laws governing sociopolitical and military-technical development of the Soviet Armed Forces.
2. The main directions for further improvement of the army and navy in light of decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress.
3. The 25th CPSU Congress on the role of science in communist development, in strengthening the country's defenses, and in raising the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

For practical purposes the plan for the seminar embraces the basic content of methodological problems associated with Soviet military development, examined in the previous training year, and it concentrates attention on the basic laws governing development of the Soviet Armed Forces. The list of recommended literature contains--in addition to the works of Marxist-Leninist classicists, the most important decisions of the party on the issues under examination, and the USSR Constitution--works by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev devoted to military development, his speeches given at the 18th Komsomol Congress, during his tour of Siberian and Far East regions, and upon presentation of the Order of Lenin and the "Gold Star" medal to the city of Minsk, and the editorial "On the Present Policy of the U.S. Government", published in PRAVDA in June 1978.

The provisions of these documents were deeply studied by the communists and broadly utilized in the concluding lessons as methodological reference points for evaluating the present era of international relations and Soviet military development, and in the course of discussion of the important problems associated with strengthening the Soviet state's defensive power.

The practice of holding summary conferences on the methodological problems of military theory and practice deserves attention. Several study groups are brought together for this purpose, and one of the most important and broadest topics is brought up for discussion.

A typical feature of the past training year was the conduct of methodological seminars and scientific-practical conferences devoted to Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's books "The Little Land" and "Resurrection" for generals and officers. Special attention was devoted to discussing problems such as troop indoctrination in the spirit

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of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, improvement of the work style of executives and troop command and control, and raising the effectiveness of party-political work.

Consequently a number of new significant factors have recently been introduced into the study of the methodological problems of military theory and practice by executive personnel. The leading methodological problems posed by the 25th CPSU Congress and by practical social and military development are now being discussed more objectively in lectures and seminars. Seminar participants have successfully mastered the art of applying the basic methodological principles to analysis of military practice and to solution of complex theoretical and practical problems associated with raising the combat readiness of the army and navy.

In the course of the lessons, the forms and methods of the training material's assimilation were enriched, the scientific philosophy and creative thinking of executives were developed, and their communist conviction was deepened. The forms of training control were made more flexible and comprehensive.

Such are some of the results of the work of methodological seminars conducted for executives within the system of Marxist-Leninist training for generals and officers.

* * *

"The Ideological Struggle and Indoctrination of Troops", by Major General D. A. Volkogonov, Chief, Propaganda and Agitation Division and Deputy Chief, Propaganda and Agitation Administration, Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate.

One of the most acute forms of the class struggle, the struggle of ideas, is a reflection of the duel between two social systems in the spiritual sphere. It represents a permanent front, the "forward edge" of which passes through the minds and hearts of millions of people, influencing their world outlook, ideals, viewpoints, convictions, and feelings. There never are any lulls or breathers in the ideological struggle. Erecting barricades in the path of socialism's peace offensive, world reaction never misses a chance to assume a counteroffensive in individual sectors of the struggle, employing anticommunism, nationalism, racism, and neofacism for this purpose. The tendency toward detente has not done away with the principal contradiction of the era--the contradiction between socialism and capitalism. As before, we witness military opposition, a political struggle, and economic competition. But the duel in the spiritual area is becoming especially acute and, as was emphasized at the 25th CPSU Congress, the problems of the ideological struggle are assuming the forefront more and more.

1. The 25th CPSU Congress on the Unique Features of the Ideological Struggle Today

The duel with bourgeois and opportunist ideology is an important part of our party's ideological work. In his speeches, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized many times that increasingly higher requirements are being imposed on our political work today. Our propaganda--both within the country and abroad--must react sensitively to changes occurring in the world; it must be resourceful and persuasive, and it must fully expose all of the enemy's ideological sabotage. If we are to effectively and aggressively oppose the influence of imperialist propaganda, we would need to consider a number of features inherent to the present stage of the struggle between communist and bourgeois ideology.

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The first feature: It is a reflection of the indisputable fact that the certain relaxation occurring in international relations is not at all weakening the ideological struggle; on the contrary it is deepening and expanding its front, imparting to it a more acute, stressful nature. This is a manifestation of the uniqueness of peaceful coexistence as a special form of class struggle. Peaceful coexistence is not some sort of unprincipled cohabitation with the capitalist world, as various ultra-leftists say today; on the contrary it creates new, additional possibilities for intensifying the class struggle with imperialism. Peaceful coexistence does not extend to relations between antagonistic classes within a capitalist state, and it does not at all signify recognition of the permanence of the exploiting structure, together with its countless social faults. It was noted back at the International Conference of Communists and Workers Parties (1969) that peaceful coexistence satisfies the general interests of the revolutionary struggle against all forms of oppression and exploitation. Promoting a deepening in the class conflicts in capitalist countries, detente is imparting something new to the duel between the two social systems.

Growth in various forms of international exchange and development of economic, commercial, scientific-technical, and cultural cooperation with countries in the other social structure are leading to a noticeable increase in immediate human contact, and to a direct collision between different ways of life, ideals, and philosophies. Bourgeois ideological centers are trying to capitalize on this feature as a means for intensifying their subversive acts, sabotage, and sophisticated attempts at infusing alien ideals, viewpoints, and conceptions into the socialist social consciousness. All of this means that all military personnel must exhibit higher political alertness, ideological vigilance, and class intolerance of all hostile influences.

The second feature: Its essence is that the present ideological duel is proceeding in highly diverse forms. The object of influence is defined very precisely in efforts to influence the consciousness of the people. Bourgeois propaganda does not conceal the fact that the principal objects of its ideological influence are the intelligentsia and the young. Such a choice is no accident. It is associated with the fact that the organizers of bourgeois ideological sabotage want to exert pressure upon the philosophy and political positions of the intelligentsia--an important "producer" of spiritual and cultural values.

Considering the important role of the Soviet intelligentsia in our people's cultural and spiritual development, bourgeois propaganda continues in its attempt to influence, at least to some degree, the positions of persons doing intellectual labor, their "production", and their moral countenance. One of the numerous known subversive ideas which bourgeois ideologists would like to introduce, to "plant" in the consciousness of our intelligentsia, is the idea that intellectuals play a "special role" in the modern world. This is a new version of a bourgeois elitist conception. It "proves" that the entire scientific and engineering elite, which is supposedly becoming more and more responsible for society's development, is riding the crest of the wave of scientific-technical progress. Consequently, these theorists conclude, the intelligentsia can no longer satisfy itself with "secondary" roles, and that it must decisively display its "independence" of government institutions.

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There is, of course, nothing new in this. In his time, V. I. Lenin himself referred to such a line of reasoning as "a vulgarization of Marxism". The essence behind it is still the same--it is an attempt to weaken the moral-political unity of socialist society, to generate social "dissatisfaction" in workers doing mental labor, and to encourage their nihilistic attitude toward our spiritual values. The organizers of such diversions would benefit by learning that the Soviet intelligentsia is inseparable from the people, that it shares their interests and aspirations, and that it makes a great contribution to communist development. Only socialism has been able to create all of the conditions for the intelligentsia's truly creative, free activity, as can be seen from the tremendous cultural achievements enjoyed by the Soviet people.

Another large social group upon which bourgeois propagandists would want to exert their undermining influence is the young. We should always keep this in mind when we evaluate the nature of modern bourgeois ideological subversion. The CPSU Central Committee decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination" emphasizes that hostile propaganda is constantly conducting a savage offensive against the minds of the Soviet people, attempting to debase socialism and exaggerate the benefits of capitalism.

Young people up to 30 years old make up more than half of our country's population. Through their deeds, study, and thoughts, the Soviet young are constantly demonstrating their unwavering faithfulness to the cause of their fathers, a faithfulness to communist ideals. At the same time, analyzing the problems associated with indoctrination of the young generation in light of the ideological struggle, we cannot fail to see that it has not experienced the class struggle which befell the fate of senior generations, that it has not participated in wars to defend the socialist fatherland, and it has not experienced many of the difficulties which lay on the shoulders of their predecessors. It takes a certain amount of time for every young man and woman and for every young soldier to test their ideological soundness, independence, and citizenship. Social and class experience do not come about right away. This is what our ideological enemies count on in particular, attempting to torpedo the ideals of collectivism, and impart a predisposition toward private ownership, and the elements of consumer psychology and political indifference.

Therefore when we display the concern that even individual soldiers would not yield to alien influence, we express not only a natural desire to protect the individual's consciousness from hostile ideals, but we also recognize this to be a unique school for achieving class maturity. When it is asserted that today's young people have not undergone the school of the class struggle--a valid thesis in general, we would have to make one qualification. The class struggle, which in the eyes of the Soviet people has now entered the international arena as an expression of a duel between two systems, has a direct bearing upon every individual: He must consider it when he makes an accurate political evaluation of events, when he must compare works of literature and art accurately, on the basis of the class criterion, and when the time comes to oppose alien morals. It is methodologically important for perception of communist ideals by our army young to be accompanied by an ability to persuasively criticize alien viewpoints and understand their social reactionary nature and danger.

The third feature: We are actively fighting today not only against bourgeois ideology but also against the ideology of modern opportunism, Maoism, and Zionism, which have noticeably intensified their anti-Marxist activities in recent years.

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The rising activity of opportunism today can be explained by a large number of causes. First of all it is associated with growth in the world revolutionary process, which is introducing new masses of people into the arena of the political and class struggle, people who are often socially immature, and who carry the elements of petty bourgeois revolutionary thought and spontaneity into the movement. To go on, bourgeois ideological centers have intensified their attempts to influence not only the social consciousness of peoples in socialist states, but also various groups representing the workers and communist movements in their own countries, being vitally interested in introducing a revisionist "Trojan horse" into their consciousness. Finally, it should be recognized that the major social changes occurring in the world and the consequences of scientific-technical progress are not being reflected adequately in the minds of the people in view of differences in their philosophical predispositions. It is no accident that many opportunist conceptions and theories are associated with the progress of science and technology, ones which make the significance of such progress absolute and speculate on the consequences of scientific-technical progress in the struggle between classes.

All of this presupposes a need for combining the struggle against bourgeois ideology with more-resolute exposure and persuasive criticism of its faithful ally--the ideology of opportunism, which is attempting to revise the most fundamental premises of Marxism-Leninism, and which is encouraging a retreat from proletarian internationalism toward nationalism and anticommunism. A tendency of accelerating convergence of openly bourgeois ideological conceptions and those which are still being masked by slogans stolen from Marxism can be seen today.

An especially large number of revisionist attacks have recently been made against proletarian internationalism. At the same time, the rich experience of the revolutionary struggle of the masses shows that the goals of society's social transformation cannot be reached apart from class solidarity and the unity of laborers, without a consideration for the general laws governing the transition from capitalism to socialism. "A deep understanding of these general laws, and reliance upon them in combination with a creative approach and consideration of the concrete conditions in each given country," notes the CPSU Central Committee's accountability report to the 25th CPSU Congress, "have been and continue to be an inalienable feature of Marxist-Leninists. And we can confidently say that while concessions to opportunism may provide some sort of temporary advantage, in the final analysis they would be harmful to the party."*

Waging a struggle against opportunism, we consider the fact that while it does maintain a general antisocialist, anti-Marxist orientation, depending on its form it bears certain unique traits. Thus right-wing opportunism, which manifests itself most often in countries that are developed in economic respects, usually makes its ideological attacks under the excuse of "improving socialism". Right-wing opportunists preach "peace among the classes", ignoring the military danger on the part of imperialism and attempting to emasculate the revolutionary orientation of Marxism. But the historical experience shows that right-wing opportunist ideology invariably surrenders its revolutionary cause in the face of reaction.

* "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 31.

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"Left-wing" opportunism, in its various forms, actively resorts to extremely revolutionary terminology and ultra-revolutionary slogans, inciting laborers and young people to thoughtless, adventurist actions which usually end in defeat. Thus the struggle against both right-wing and "left-wing" opportunism, which objectively is an ally of bourgeois ideology, is important today.

These features of the ideological struggle, as well as some others (its global scope, change in the concrete forms and methods of its conduct, intensification of the psychological accent in the ideological diversions of bourgeois propaganda), emphasize with even greater clarity the indisputability of the fact that detente is not weakening the manifestations of the principal contradiction of this era--the contradiction between socialism and capitalism. As before, we are opposed by the imperialist world, and although its aggressive possibilities have been reduced, as was noted at the 25th CPSU Congress, its nature continues to be the same.* Its basic ideological-political weapon--anticommunism--has remained the same as well, though some new factors have appeared in the tactics and forms of struggle and in organizational activities.

2. Anticommunism--the Main Ideological-Political Weapon of Imperialism

Modern bourgeois ideology has a clearly expressed anticommunist nature. Imperialism is still able to unite all reactionary forces beneath the black banner of anti-communism in the hope of defending the interests of the bourgeoisie. Given the highly acute contradictions in the "free" world, anticommunism is today the sole platform of relative consolidation of forces hostile to socialism. This allows our class enemy, the 25th CPSU Congress noted, to actively coordinate its anticommunist actions on an international scale.**

Anticommunism is not only the core of bourgeois ideology, but it is also a concrete political resource, a weapon against the world of socialism, against Marxist-Leninist ideology. As we know, anticommunism basically entails slander of the socialist structure, falsification of the policies and goals of communist parties and Marxist-Leninist theory, and open apology of the capitalist structure. The bourgeois world's hatred of communism, Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the new socialist structure stems from the fundamental contradiction between the class interests of the bourgeoisie and the laborers, and from the fear of the inevitable victories of the people of labor over capitalism. As a bourgeois ideological trend and a political weapon of imperialism, anticommunism is attempting to decelerate social progress, paralyze the workers movement, and discredit and subvert the unity of the socialist fraternity.

The ideology of anticommunism is variegated and multifaceted. But at its core, we always find anti-Sovietism, a constant desire to cause maximum harm to the socialist structure in the USSR and in other fraternal countries. Anticommunist ideology may be conditionally subdivided into two levels depending on the nature of its development--theoretical and empirical. Theoretical anticommunism claims to be scientific, and it parasitizes mainly political awareness, philosophy, sociology, history, and

* See "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS," p 24.

** See Ibid., p 31.

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law. The theorists of anticommunism never cease their attempts to refute Marxism-Leninism, to demonstrate its "obsolescence" and its "inconsistency with modern times", as well as its "great future in national standards". Theoretical anticommunism has given its blessing to numerous anti-Marxist theories of recent years, such as "convergence", "deideologization", "a unified industrial society", and so on.

Bourgeois ideologists still hope to "refute" Marxism-Leninism. There is nothing new here, of course. This has always been one of the aims of bourgeois ideology. The efforts of those who wish to "refute" Marxism-Leninism are well known. The only difference today lies in a certain shift in the accent of their attacks. The struggle is being waged today not so much directly against Marxist-Leninist theory as against its real embodiment--the world socialist system and its concrete achievements.

This is precisely what explains the emergence of a large number of various "specialists on individual socialist countries and problems, ones who seek all possibilities for exerting a hostile influence upon socialist and communist development and for distorting the achievements of the socialist world. "Refuting" Marxism through theory, bourgeois ideology is at the same time justifying its right to "restrain" communism by military means. This expresses itself as justification of the arms race, growth of militarism, and aggression.

But the historical experience shows that such "refutations" have never reaped any major dividends for imperialism. This forces bourgeois ideologists to seek certain "similarities" between socialism and capitalism, something in common between the two ideologies more and more frequently. This is referred to by the term "convergence". Numerous theories of such "convergence" have been conceived: "synthesis of ideologies", "ideological hybrid", "modernized socialism", and so on. An acquaintance with these theoretical conceptions of bourgeois ideology would show that the main prerequisite of "convergence" is, supposedly, the surrender of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Such vain hope! The ideological tightrope-walking by bourgeois theorists cannot mislead us. "Development of the world socialist system and the world capitalist system," emphasizes the CPSU Program, "is proceeding according to directly opposite laws."* What is typical of our era is not "convergence" but growth of the political, economic, and spiritual superiority of socialism over capitalism.

Close in line with the theories of "convergence" are ideas, fashionable in the West today, of so-called "de-ideologization" of the individual, "his release from all ideological and political viewpoints and principles". Arguments of the following sort are suggested: The scientific-technical revolution can allegedly resolve all social problems on its own, and man has no reason or time to deal with politics. In fact, however, the theory of "the end of ideology" is itself also an ideology, one striving to encourage political passiveness and pessimism in the masses and a mistrust of their strength. This is yet another myth of bourgeois ideology attesting to its profound crisis and showing it to be incapable of suggesting ideas of any significance whatsoever.

* "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], p 22.

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Theoretical anticommunism in general reflects, if we may be permitted to put it this way, the strategic directions of imperialism's struggle against the world socialist system and the ideology of Marxism-Leninism.

There is also empirical, "vulgar" anticommunism, the products of which are used mainly in imperialism's "psychological warfare". Aiming at the mundane level of consciousness, bourgeois propaganda centers are attempting to spread various fabrications about the Soviet realities and about the socialist armed forces, and they are trying to resurrect nationalistic prejudices and private-owner tendencies; efforts to represent various aspects of the life of socialist society in distorted form continue. "Vulgar" anticommunism is more mobile in its reactions to current events, and its actions appear to have a "tactical" nature. Naturally subdivision of anticommunism into these variants is highly arbitrary, but it does express the variations existing in the efforts of the modern bourgeois machinery of subversive warfare.

Recommendations for ideological struggle and "psychological warfare" are being suggested by numerous centers in capitalist countries. The largest number of such centers is concentrated in the USA. Here are just a few of them. The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace has been operating in California for more than 50 years. Its principal purpose is to theoretically explore the ways to "break apart" and "soften" world communism. The products of this institute are broadly employed in subversive radio propaganda and in printed publications.

The Hudson Institute occupies a prominent place within the machinery of ideological struggle and "psychological warfare", performing basically in response to special orders from the Central Intelligence Agency. It is known in particular that one of the institute's main tasks is to study issues associated with the strategy and tactics of "psychological warfare" against the socialist countries. On the basis of the institute's recommendations the U.S. International Communication Agency--the principal coordinating organ of subversive psychological actions--compiles concrete instructions for "psychological warfare".

The Institute for Communist Problems at Columbia University in New York deals predominantly with problems associated with organizing ideological operations connected with concrete historic and political events. The "researchers" of this anticommunism center are presently known as proponents of "subtle" methods, "quiet" counterrevolution, and gradual "disintegration" of the socialist system.

The "Russian Center" of Columbia University trains personnel to manage the ideological struggle. Sovietologists with diplomas in journalism, sociology, and history are working in practically all anti-Soviet centers and for editorial offices of different "persuasions". These are the professional specialists of ideological warfare.

The Center for Strategic Studies at Georgetown University occupies a noticeable place among these institutes. This center deals primarily with the military aspects of the ideological struggle. It constantly analyzes the status of the material and moral factors of socialist communities, and it draws up recommendations on subverting them in peacetime and wartime. In particular, the specialists of this center constantly search for the "weak link" in the spiritual status of the enemy

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in every concrete historic segment of time. In their opinion this makes it possible to channel subversive efforts more purposefully.

I have named only a few centers, while in the USA alone there are about 200 of them (institutes, committees, funds, councils, associations, programs, legions, and so on). A large number of subversive centers are also functioning in other capitalist countries. Most of them are subsidized by state budgets, and they fill specific sociopolitical orders of the militant wing of monopolistic bourgeoisie.

The mass media play the main role in the technical machinery of "psychological warfare". By silent agreement, the bulk of them have in a sense "subdivided" their functions of influence among each other. Radio usually reports what is happening where; television reports how this is happening; the press tries to answer why it happened. Radio is characterized by ease of reception and global scope; television is in a sense capable of making the individual experience the news directly; the press is capable of demonstrating and revealing the cause-and-effect relationships of events more deeply. But of course, it all depends on the social source of information and its class position. Imperialists specializing in the ideological struggle devote a special place to radio propaganda. Besides the broadly known anticommunist radio centers such as the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), "Voice of America", "Radio Free Europe", "Freedom", "German Wave", and others, there are dozens more radio sources engaged in subversive propaganda. Just within the Soviet Union alone, the volume of radio broadcasts totals more than one and a half thousand radio hours per week, in the 24 languages of the peoples of the USSR. Imperialism's military propaganda machine also enjoys great technical possibilities. The American sociologist T. Coffin writes in his book "The Passion of the Vultures" that: "In its plans for political and moral training of the personnel, and for 'psychological warfare', the Pentagon possesses an enormous propaganda machine. Just abroad alone, the U.S. Armed Forces have 250 large broadcasting stations and 24 television studios. All of the broadcasts of these centers are chock-full of anticommunism and American morality."

In their transmissions, bourgeois ideological centers devote a special place to intensifying influence upon personnel of socialist armies. The hope is to induce political apathy, individualism, money-grubbing, and nationalism into the consciousness. "If we could create a channel into an individual's moral consciousness to permit entry of ideas about the free world while he is still young, the individual in the uniform of the Red soldier would not be fanatically devoted to communism," hopes the bourgeois military sociologist R. Gravers.

While preserving their anticommunist orientation, bourgeois propaganda and the concrete actions of "psychological warfare" have become more flexible and sophisticated. An accent on making the information appear objective and "independent" is especially noticeable today. It makes broad use of ideological myths, propagandistic cliches, and social illusions such as "freedom of the personality", "human rights", the "democracy" of Western systems, and so on. Naturally, the fact that the capitalist system is directly responsible for the birth of fascism, racism, unemployment, spiritual oppression, and numerous other social ills of imperialism is played down in this "objective" information.

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3. The Struggle of Ideas in Military Affairs and Indoctrination of Soviet Soldiers in the Spirit of Intolerance of Bourgeois Ideology

Peace and its fate now occupy a central place in the ideological struggle. There are influential forces in the capitalist world which have taken certain steps toward detente in response to pressure, as a result of certain changes in the balance of the world's forces in favor of socialism. But they are now being persuaded that in an environment of peaceful coexistence, development of socialist cooperation in economics, culture, and other areas may proceed even faster and more effectively. Therefore imperialist reaction is doing everything it can to return the world to a cold war situation, to "freeze" positive processes occurring in international relations.

Discrediting relaxation of tension, bourgeois ideologists believe it to be illusory because, they feel, the military power of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries is constantly growing and that this is allegedly creating a threat to all of the "Western world". The myth of the so-called Soviet threat, it was noted at the 25th CPSU Congress, is also brought up whenever it becomes necessary to enlarge a military budget and concurrently reduce outlays on social needs, when new forms of death-dealing weapons must be developed, and when attempts are made to justify NATO's military aggressiveness. "In fact," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "there is no Soviet threat to either the West or the East. All of this is a monstrous lie--from the beginning to the end."*

In reality, however, we see that the main threat to peace continues to have its source in imperialism, in the military-industrial complex of the imperialist states, which is still pursuing its arms race. Unfortunately the trend toward detente has not weakened the arms race or reduced the growth in the influence of militarism upon all aspects of life in capitalist countries. Modern militarism which, in V. I. Lenin's words, is a "vital manifestation" of capitalism,** and which has retained its social and reactionary essence, has concurrently acquired a number of new specific traits, which we must account for in the ideological struggle. Their emergence stems from capitalism's aspiration to adapt itself to the new situation in the world, to the changes which are constantly occurring in the balance of forces between the two social systems.

In the sociopolitical area, militarism, which has completely retained its anti-communist, anti-Soviet orientation, is forced to reckon with new realities in a number of cases, and account for the requirements of new treaties and agreements. Open appeals for a "crusade" against communism are now rare. The demand to "free" East Europe is now a historical anachronism. And notions of the "inevitable demise of the Reds" now appear entirely absurd. Today, bourgeois politicians and ideologists are speaking less about "superiority" and "domination", referring instead to "balance", "parity", "slipping advantage", and so on. The following paradox is becoming increasingly more obvious: The military possibilities of imperialism's aggressive blocs are growing, but their capability for imposing their will upon

* "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS," p 22.

** See Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Completed Collected Works], Vol 17, p 187.

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other states is decreasing relentlessly. All of this is a consequence of objective changes in the balance of forces in the favor of socialism. That the Soviet threat is a fabrication is becoming increasingly more evident. Evolution in the setbacks of militarism can also be seen in the mosaic of military-political doctrines that have been superseding one another. From open threats of nuclear "annihilation of communism" to the conceptions of "deterrence"--such has been the path of gradual loss in strategic confidence in the possibility for resolving the principal contradiction by "nuclear" means.

What is new in the economic sphere of militarism is that monopolies producing arms are growing closer to the state administration, forming a predatory social hybrid--the military-industrial complex. It bears all the traits of the capitalist system's contradictory development. And as we know, the capitalist system's economy has been recently typified by profound instability, setbacks in the marketplace, staggering inflation, and unceasing monetary crisis. The monetary upheavals, which the capitalist world had never witnessed on such a scale, are especially intensive. The repeal of the dollar's gold backing, devaluation of national currencies, review of their parity, enormous shifts in the money supply, and other phenomena are being elicited to a significant extent by the unrestrained growth of the economy's militarization, the arms race, and faulty development of the economic structures of the capitalist states. The fact that the NATO countries fuel the furnace of the machine of military preparations with more than \$100 billion each year cannot but have an effect. On one hand militarism is, to the monopolies, a convenient means for reaping fantastic superprofits; on the other hand this process itself is unavoidably breaking down the entire economic mechanism of capitalism, which is now functioning with noticeable interruptions. Despite the persistent demands of the laboring masses in capitalist countries to limit the growth of military budgets, the arms race has not slackened. Thus the U.S. budget for fiscal year 1979 foresees almost \$130 billion for the Pentagon's military needs. Later, by 1980, outlays on the arms race are to be increased to an enormous sum--\$150 billion.

In the scientific-technical area, modern militarism is typified by maximum use of the latest achievements of science and technology in the military area. "...the labor of many millions of people, the brilliant achievements of human reason, and the talent of scientists, researchers, and engineers are being channeled not for the benefit of mankind, and they are serving not the cause of progress and transformation of life on earth, but instead they are being used for barbarian, reactionary purposes, for the needs of war--this greatest woe of mankind."* Thus in the USA, for example, about 70 percent of the money spent on science is used up in military research; about 80 percent of the country's scientists are involved in the creation of various arms. In the last 5 years the USA has spent a colossal sum on scientific research in military affairs--about \$70 billion. The bulk of these assets are being used to develop strategic nuclear missile forces, and to create qualitatively new submarine-launched missile systems, antimissile systems, laser technology, and antisubmarine defense resources. New assets, new orders, and capable scientists are constantly being added to the effort. As a result the military-scientific areas are developing much faster than others.

* "Mezhdunarodnoye Soveshchaniye kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partiy. Dokumenty i materialy" [The International Conference of Communists and Workers Parties. Documents and Materials], Moscow, 1969, p 47.

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Science is in fact transforming, in imperialism, into one of the most important elements of militarism, being a powerful accelerator of the arms race.

Modern militarism possesses some new specific traits in the spiritual area as well. We can perhaps refer to the existence of an ideology of militarism: that part, that aspect of bourgeois ideology which "justifies", validates the arms race and the aggressive course of reactionary circles. Various centers have come into being: The Institute for the Study of International Conflicts in London, the Institute for the Study of the Problems of Peace in Oslo, the Center for Study of Conflict Situations in Michigan, the International Institute of the Problems of Peace in Stockholm, and others. Pacifist abstract appeals to establish just international relations fail to single out the main perpetrator of wars in modern times. In most cases the olive branches on the emblems of such centers do not signify disappearance of anticommunist, anti-Soviet designs in their explorations. Thus the Giessen Center for Research on the Problems of Peace and Conflicts (FRG) argues in one of the books it has published, "Peace in Europe?", that "both the states of NATO and countries of the Warsaw Pact are equally to blame for the continuation of the arms race." At the same time authors adhering to more-rigid, militant positions continue to assert that the arms race and the military preparations of imperialism are forced upon the latter, being a natural reaction to "the aggressiveness of world communism". No matter how the situation might change, and no matter how international relations might improve, militarism will always need to ideologically "validate" the "Soviet threat", and it will always ascribe expansionist plans to the socialist system. Otherwise even considering the experience of the political demagoguery of many bourgeois propaganda organs, it would be simply impossible to justify the growth of militarism.

Some of these traits of modern militarism only make it more adaptable to new conditions, and they do not at all signify a weakening of its reactionary role in the life of bourgeois communities. The very existence of militarism, and its various manifestations, are nothing more than one of the expressions of the general crisis of capitalism.

Documented demonstration of the danger contained in the actions of today's bosses of the military-industrial complex, exposure of their true aims, and revelation of the groundlessness of the malicious myth of a Soviet threat make up an important task in the ideological-political indoctrination of the personnel.

References to the "military danger" on the part of the Soviet Union and world socialism would be found to be absolutely illusory, if we were to think about the way things are today. Having achieved unprecedented power and reduced imperialism's world influence in many areas, the world socialist system has been channeling all of its influence not at "further expansion" (something always ascribed to socialism by its foes) but at the "peace offensive". This fundamentally important act expresses not only the peaceful essence of socialism and its optimistic confidence that it will win even in a situation of peaceful coexistence, but it also reveals, once again, the total groundlessness of the old anticommunist cliché of a Soviet military threat.

The ideological struggle in the military area involves many other issues as well. Thus bourgeois ideological centers are continuing to try to distort the social role played by the socialist armed forces in the modern world, to prove the

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obsolescence of the principle of the international character of socialism's defense, and to cast a shadow over the methodological and fundamental premises of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. In the final analysis, the goal is the same: to weaken and diminish the significance of the activities of the CPSU and other fraternal parties aimed at averting war and materializing detente, and to discredit the armed forces of socialism, which are a dependable guarantee of the peace and security of nations.

It would be important to remember that bourgeois propaganda, striving to deform the truth, is creating a distorted picture of current events in the hope of inducing alien ideals, viewpoints, tastes, and values in the social and individual consciousness. The bourgeoisie, noted V. I. Lenin, cannot influence the masses "without a widely branched, well-organized, well-equipped system of cajolery, falsehood, fraud, and sleight of hand with fashionable and popular slogans...."

The most important prerequisite for successfully opposing bourgeois propagandistic, psychological influence is to make sure that the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces possess communist convictions and a scientific philosophy. Communist conviction, which expresses whole-hearted devotion to the socialist motherland and to Marxist-Leninist ideals, equally presupposes intolerance of their enemies. In the social portrait of the Soviet soldier, intolerance of the enemies of socialism is an important moral-political quality.

Our intolerance of the enemies of socialism means not simply defending the concrete achievements of socialism in the material, political, and spiritual spheres, but it presupposes an offensive spirit, aggressiveness in the struggle against all hostile phenomena, attacks, and designs.

Intolerance of the enemies of socialism is always grounded on clear, distinct class positions expressed in definite ideological concepts and Marxist-Leninist theoretical premises. The attempts of the ideological enemy to "diffuse", to deprive some concepts of their class accent, for example "liberty", "democracy", and "human rights", are aimed at "liberating" people from clear social attitudes and perspectives. Attacking Leninism, ideological saboteurs often resort to socialist phraseology, and they often cloak themselves in Marxist clothing. Therefore intolerance of the enemies of socialism also presupposes our constant vigilance in theory.

Intolerance of the enemies of socialism manifests itself in the day-to-day practical activities of the individual, in his capability for defending a fundamentally valid point of view, in his ability to make a correct assessment of political events, human acts, and intentions. Intolerance of that which is hostile and alien--an important facet of the character of the Soviet soldier--expresses itself as a negative attitude toward various rumors and half-baked ideas, as stable social activity, and as adherence to principles in all things large and small. Our intolerance of the enemies of socialism, of bourgeois ideology, and of the cliches of "psychological warfare" is not a blind fanatic feeling but a deeply recognized understanding of the fundamental contradiction in the ideals, programs, goals, and the resources of their attainment in the socialist and bourgeois worlds. And not even the most sophisticated tactics of professionals in "psychological warfare"

* Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 30, p 176.

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can shake our philosophical viewpoints on the surrounding world, or raise doubts about our ideals or our unshakeable confidence in the inevitable and final triumph of the great cause of Marxism-Leninism.

* * *

"Organization of Political Information for Officers", by Rear Admiral I. N. Petrov, Chief, Propaganda and Agitation Division, and Deputy Chief, Naval Political Directorate

Our country now possesses a strong oceanic fleet capable of protecting its state interests. The ocean is the principal school for the seaman. Most training missions are now conducted at sea. Naval officers have the decisive role in raising the effectiveness of long ship cruises and sorties flown by marine aviation, and in the quality of the entire process of combat and political training.

The competency and responsibility of officers is one of the cornerstones of the foundation upon which the capability of the military collective for successfully completing its combat training missions rests.

The USSR Constitution--the Fundamental Law of the Soviet state--declares: "The duty of the USSR Armed Forces before the people is to dependably protect the socialist fatherland, to be in constant combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate repulse to any aggressor."

Officers--dependable supporters of the party and government in the army and navy--have the leading role in this most important mission. They indoctrinate the personnel in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, and devotion to the ideals of communism, they impart love for military affairs, they teach the art of handling complex combat equipment, and the tactics of combat, they form high moral and fighting qualities in the soldiers, they generate conscious discipline, and they maintain strict order and organization in the subunits and units, and aboard ships.

The Communist Party attaches great significance to indoctrination of executives. It was emphasized with special force at the 25th CPSU Congress that as we progress, the requirements imposed upon our executives constantly grow.

The 25th CPSU Congress demonstrated quite persuasively that modern times are bringing new tasks associated with the party's ideological activities into being. This premise was developed in party documents written subsequently. Thus in particular, the CPSU Central Committee decree "On Further Improvement of the System of the Ideological-Theoretical Level and Official Qualifications of Party and Soviet Executives" emphasizes that in addition to improving their training, there is increasingly greater importance in constantly raising their ideological-theoretical level. This premise pertains wholly to military personnel as well.

In fact, broadening of the scale and growth in the complexity of the tasks of communist development, the dynamic nature of the present international situation, and the need for deeply knowing military theory and practice and improving the forms and methods of subordinate political and military indoctrination require systematic expansion of the political outlook of officers.

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One of the most important demands stated in the Central Committee decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination" is that of constantly increasing the effectiveness of ideological indoctrination, of insuring that propaganda and agitation remain at a high level.

Political briefings occupy an important place in the efforts to raise the ideological maturity of officers and nurture their high responsibility for their work. Such briefings have become an effective form of ideological indoctrination of officers. The main goal of the political briefing is to regularly and efficiently bring to the awareness of officers the most important party and government decisions, to acquaint them with the achievements of Soviet people in economic, social, and cultural development, and to explain the basic problems of domestic and international life, the pressing issues of party and military development, and the current tasks of combat and political training. Political briefings help to form a communist philosophy in the officers, and they promote growth in their sociopolitical activity and their responsibility for performing their constitutional duty before the motherland.

An efficient system for providing information to officers has evolved aboard ships and in the units in response to the requirements of the USSR Minister of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. Political briefings are held regularly twice a month, and they last 1 hour. When ships are on a long cruise, these briefings are made shorter, but they are conducted more often. They are an effective form of oral political agitation and not a means for transmitting information of general scientific, technical, military, and official nature.

The fleet's political organs are systematically trying to make officers politically more informed, and they take pains to raise the class relevancy, substantiation, and effectiveness of the information provided. The CPSU Central Committee decree "On Raising the Role of Oral Political Agitation in Fulfillment of Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress" notes that the political briefing has been and continues to be an important sphere of party activity, one of the active forms of the party's constant ties with the masses, of their unification around the CPSU and its Leninist Central Committee. And although political briefings are a relatively new form for officers, they have recommended themselves as a most effective resource. Experience has shown that political briefings are most effective when they are well documented, when they are tailored precisely to the audience, and when they deal directly and openly with important current problems troubling the people. When we organize a political briefing, we consider the fact that in view of the specific features of their activity and their constant work on themselves, the officers are well informed about events illuminated in the press or broadcast on radio and television. Therefore the success of a political briefing would depend on choice of the topic and on the depth of analysis and generalization of material that is already generally known. It depends on whether or not something new is communicated to the listeners. In terms of their content and the way the material is presented, political briefings for officers are similar in many ways to short lectures.

Problems associated with making officers more informed are at the center of attention of the commanders, political workers, and party organizations of ships and naval units.

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Study of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's books "The Little Land", "Resurrection", and "Virgin Soil" has important significance to ideological indoctrination. These books demonstrate, with great persuasiveness, the roots of the patriotism and spiritual strength of the Soviet people, roots embodied within the socialist structure and Communist Party leadership. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's experience and statements teach ideological personnel to master effective methods of indoctrination, and of all party activity, to improve the style of this activity, and to work with people creatively, knowledgeably, and with a consideration for concrete conditions.

Seminars and scientific-practical and reader's conferences have been held on these books aboard the navy's ships and in its units. Political briefings have been held for the officers; in them, the great significance of these works as a source of inspiration for naval seamen in their efforts to raise the fighting power of the navy and improve party-political work was noted.

Special attention is devoted to selecting the officers that are to give political briefings. This work is assigned to experienced, theoretically trained propagandists capable of commenting knowledgeably on the political, economic, and cultural life of the country and the international situation, explaining the tasks of the fatherland's defense, and revealing the principles and norms of communist morality, and the moral outlook of the Soviet officer. In recent years the proportion of executive personnel giving such briefings has risen noticeably. In most cases formation and unit commanders and officers representing political organs and staff serve as political briefers. This produces positive results. The speeches of these comrades are heard with great interest, inasmuch as they are well prepared in theory and have considerable experience in indoctrination work, they are capable of knowledgeably explaining current events, and they can answer troubling questions, persuasively expose the slanderous fabrications of bourgeois propaganda, raise the people's interest, encourage their creative energy, and nurture a feeling of responsibility for assigned work. Interesting and substantial political briefings are given by V. I. Kas'yanov, N. Ye. Khromov, A. D. Kolchin, Yu. I. Kovalenko, I. M. Ishchenko, and others.

The practice of having party and soviet officials, scientists, and cultural workers speak at officer political briefings has recommended itself well. Lecturers, instructors from academies and schools, and scientists visiting on business trips are actively employed for this purpose in the twice-awarded Red Banner Baltic Fleet. Interesting political briefings have been given by Doctor of Legal Sciences N. I. Shapiro, Doctor of Historical Sciences, CPSU Central Committee Lecturer L. M. Spirin, Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Lecturer, Candidate of Economic Sciences L. D. Gasparyan, Naval Political Directorate Lecturer, Captain 1st Rank V. A. Tokun, Naval Academy Instructor, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Captain 1st Rank N. E. Buzhkevich, Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin Instructor, Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences, Captain 1st Rank V. F. Studentov, and others.

The practice of systematically analyzing work with officers conducting political briefings and analyzing the orientation of these briefings has evolved in the political organs. The results are discussed with executive personnel at rallies and meetings, and in training sessions for propagandists.

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Much attention is devoted to the efficiency and timeliness of political briefings for officers. The political section of one certain formation conducted a special discussion of this issue at a conference of commanders and political workers. Recommendations were arrived at, and the subject matter of political briefings was determined, based on Comrade Brezhnev's trip to Siberia and the Far East, and on his speech to seamen of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet. The bulk of the attention was concentrated on raising the quality of combat and political training, on nurturing the personnel's alertness, and on finding ways to improve party-political work.

Problems associated with raising the excellence of political briefings for officers and with the participation of executives in such briefings are discussed at meetings of the active party members. Thus the status and measures for improving ideological-theoretical and moral indoctrination of officers in light of the requirements of the 25th CPSU Congress were the topic of thorough analysis by active party members at the naval base and higher naval educational institutions of Leningrad.

Political organs and party organizations attach great significance to keeping officers well informed during long cruises. During preparations for a cruise, political sections instruct the political workers, they supply references and visual aids to them, and they provide advice on ways for conducting the briefings. Special attention is turned to the ability to use materials sent to ships at sea by the naval political directorate.

The plans for briefings to be given on long cruises are dominated by topics associated with the military-political situation in the cruising region and with the nature of the missions being performed. Information obtained via naval communication channels is immediately brought to the awareness of officers in personal interviews, through the internal broadcasting system, and with the help of special displays. Briefings are conducted in shifts of 30 minutes each, twice a week. In view of the unique features of the work of officers such as navigators, signalmen, and watch officers, such persons are often briefed individually, at the battle stations and command posts when necessary.

During long cruises or when ships are separated from their formations, political briefings are conducted by commanders, their deputies for political affairs, and other experienced officers. If representatives of the command or officers from the political section or staff of the formation are aboard ship, they are included in the briefing schedule as well.

Representatives of Soviet embassies and other colleagues of the USSR's agencies in foreign countries regularly speak to officers aboard ships visiting foreign ports. This provides great practical assistance to the officers, helping them to successfully complete their specific tasks associated with official visits and supply stops.

Many of the navy's units and ships have accumulated good experience in organizing and conducting political briefings for officers. They are conducted competently and on a high ideological level in the Red Banner Northern Fleet unit in which Captain 2d Rank L. V. Lysenko serves as the political worker. It is always

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made sure here that the subject matter of the briefings would be in keeping with the requirements of the times, and that it would be interesting and substantial. Officers are given briefings in the following basic areas: the 25th CPSU Congress on the country's socioeconomic development in the present stage; the Soviet people's successes in economic development; the party's foreign policy activities, and the USSR's international situation; development of the armed forces, the achievements of military science, and the tasks of combat training and raising the combat readiness of the ships and units. Not less than two or three political briefings are planned for each problem. This makes it possible to reveal the subject matter more deeply, and to avoid its superficial presentation.

Monthly planning insures timely, high quality preparation of political briefers for the talks. The day-to-day activities invariably cause changes in the briefing plan; because such corrections can be made, the briefers can respond effectively to current events.

The CPSU Central Committee decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination" emphasizes the need for reinforcing the propagandist core with experienced, theoretically trained activists capable of knowledgeably commenting on problems associated with the country's political, economic, and cultural life and with the international situation, and explain the principles and norms of communist morality and the Soviet way of life. Considering this requirement, commanders and political workers capable of closely tying in their political briefings with the tasks of combat training are encouraged to conduct briefings for officers.

Political briefers undergo methodological training regularly and purposefully in this unit. Instruction sessions, methodological lessons, seminars, lectures, discussions, advisory sessions, and periodical reviews are organized for them. Scientific-practical conferences, lecturer days, question-and-answer evenings, oral journals, and legal propaganda days are organized for these propagandists in order to raise their overall outlook. In one of the seminars a senior political worker described the methods and unique features of briefings. Captain 1st Rank V. V. Naumov, one of the best political briefers, shared his experience in organizing such briefings.

A group of consultants provides great assistance to political briefers. It contains the best-trained propagandists and political workers. Its library contains a selection of reference literature, selections of reading materials from newspapers are available, and recommendations on and generalized experience in conducting political briefings are provided.

Practice shows that wherever this important work is conducted systematically and efficiently, and the content of briefings satisfies the interests and needs of military personnel, the Marxist-Leninist maturity of officers is higher, their understanding of their practical tasks is better, and consequently the quality of their work is higher.

The command and party organization of the large antisubmarine warfare ship "Marshal Timoshenko" are constantly concerned about political briefings for officers; this has a positive effect on the level of political training and indoctrination of

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the personnel, on the tasks of combat training, and on satisfaction of socialist pledges. This ship constantly achieves high results in combat and political training, and it has held the lead in the competition for a long period of time.

A strictly differentiated approach is necessary in work with officers and admirals conducting political briefings for officers. As an example one propagandist might have perfect mastery of the methods while another might need help in this area. Brief instructions would be enough for the former, while the other would need detailed consultation. All of this must be considered when determining the nature of assistance given to officers.

The practice of specializing propagandists has evolved in connection with the broad range of issues dealt with in political briefings for officers. Some speak on various aspects of the country's domestic life, others discuss the international situation and the Soviet Union's foreign policy course, and still others deal with the military-political situation in the ship's cruising region.

Reference and information centers formed at the officers' clubs of fleet garrisons play a significant role in raising the methodological proficiency of political briefers and their theoretical level. They are a source of diverse information on important topics associated with the political and military indoctrination of the personnel. The main goal of a reference and information center is to provide constant assistance to oral propagandists and agitators, to include political briefers, in their theoretical and methodological training, their systematic instruction, and their efficient orientation in relation to the pressing problems of party-political work and the most important events in the country and abroad. Generalization and dissemination of the experience of the best political briefers is an important aspect of their activity.

This work is organized objectively and purposefully at the reference and information center of the officers club headed by Captain 2d Rank V. N. Martynenko. A methodological council has been created here for work with propagandists. It is staffed by the deputy chief of the political section, a propagandist, the chief of the party school, a representative of the procurator's office, the chief of the fleet museum, and a librarian specializing in briefing methods. Lectures, advisory sessions, training lessons, and question-and-answer evenings are conducted for propagandists. Political briefers have attended lectures such as the following: "The CPSU's Concern for Developing the Industrial-Power Complexes of East Siberia in the 10th Five-Year Plan", "The Activities of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance", "The North Atlantic and the Plans of NATO", "The Good of the People--the Highest Goal of the Party".

Universities of Marxism-Leninism are providing a certain amount of assistance in raising the ideological-theoretical level and improving the performance of political briefers. The practice of having their students provide briefings based on report materials has been introduced. Successful briefings have been given, for example, by L. T. Karatun on the topic "The New USSR Constitution--an Important Landmark in the Political History of Our Country" and by A. L. Golovin on the topic "Militarization of the NATO Countries--a Real Threat to Peace and Security".

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In their practical work with political briefers, political organs actively utilize meetings with scientists and production leaders, and visits to industrial enterprises, kolchozes, and sovkhozes. This significantly enriches the propagandists, and it provides them a possibility for illustrating their materials with concrete examples from the development of the economy and fulfillment of the assignments of the 10th Five-Year Plan.

A differentiated approach is taken to different categories of listeners in the political briefings given in many units. Different briefings are given to staff workers, shift commanders, and young officers. Naturally the effectiveness of political briefings rises noticeably when visual aids are used in them. Propagandists usually make use of maps, diagrams, charts, and posters. Special pictorial displays are a help. Albums of visual aids based on the proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress, decrees of CPSU Central Committee plenums and USSR Supreme Soviet sessions, the USSR Constitution, and material from the life of the ships and units are broadly employed; these albums are published by the fleet political directorate. Briefings are often accompanied by newsreels. Thus political briefings given aboard units and ships of the Red Banner Northern Fleet on materials devoted to the 60th anniversary of Great October and the Soviet Armed Forces were accompanied by excerpts from the film "The Living Lenin", "The Story of Lenin", "My Country", "The USSR's Golden Anniversary", "A Great Act of Heroism", "I Serve the Revolution", and others. Combination of narration and visual aids makes the briefings more substantial, and emotionally saturated.

The best experience in organizing and conducting political briefings is broadly illuminated in the fleet newspaper, and the efforts of the best political briefers are described in leaflets. The Red Banner Pacific Fleet's newspaper BOYEYAYA VAKHTA, regularly publishes materials on the speaking skills of propagandists, and it offers material for reports on the most important political events in the country. The editor's office of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet's newspaper FLAG RODINY tries to clearly describe the practical efforts of commanders, political organs, and party organizations to publicize the proceedings and decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, and ideological indoctrination aboard the ships and in the units. It regularly publishes articles on the methods of propaganda work in a department entitled "Scientific Substantiation, Concreteness, and Aggressiveness in Ideological Work".

The political organs of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet attach great significance to studying the nature of current problems brought up at political briefings. All of this is accounted for when determining the subject matter of subsequent briefings, and it actively promotes expansion of the outlook of the officers. Thus a cycle of political briefings on the topic "The Soviet Armed Forces Standing Guard Over the Achievements of Great October" was conducted in response to the requests of officers in many of the fleet's party organizations.

The political briefing is the most important form of nurturing communist conviction in listeners. Its constant improvement is promoting comprehensive indoctrination of officers, and their mobilization for successful completion of the tasks posed to the Soviet Armed Forces by the Communist Party and the Soviet government. Utilizing the accumulated experience, commanders and political organs are doing everything they can to make this important work proceed at the required ideological and methodological level.

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